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CREDITORS' IMAGINED COMMUNITIES AND THE




While scholars debate the fairness and efficiency offull priority secured
lending and asset securitization, lawmakers pass statutes that only ex-
pand these types offinancing. Lawmakers seem compelled to err in fa-
vor ofsophisticated secured creditors and against creditors in weak bar-
gaining positions. This article addresses why non-adjusting creditors
remain on the sidelines as lawmakers embrace legislation encouraging
asset securitization and expanding UCC Article 9. It argues that non-
adjusting creditors'positions must be understood in relation to a socio-
political climate steeped in deference to the needs of institutional credi-
tors. Contemporary media on finance and business evidence this socio-
political climate. There is an acute lack of critical distance from financ-
ing activities that pervades journalism in the United States. This lack of
critical distance in public discourse on finance is a form of disregard of
economic inequality among Americans. This article hypothesizes that
disregard of inequality in business reporting indicates an imagined
community of investors with which even disadvantaged creditors identify.
Widespread identification with an imagined community of investors en-
ables secured creditors to present unfettered expansion of business credit
as consonant with public interest both within the UCC drafting process
and before the state legislatures. Legal scholars have failed to take is-
sues of broad socio-political climate into account in analyses of how and
why the law continues to expand secured creditors' domain.
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INTRODUCTION
The major overhaul of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC")' that concluded in 2002 went unreported in the mainstream
media. Lawmakers, reporters and UCC scholars seem to regard Article 9
as a technical statute inappropriate for widespread public debate.2 In
addition, many scholars find that Article 9 is drafted in an insular proc-
ess 3 dominated by secured creditors that disregards third party effects of
secured transactions.4 This article presents an alternative view of the
politics 5 that enable secured creditors' control over current laws govern-
ing secured transactions. This article rejects the notion that secured
creditors' control results primarily from the insularity of the UCC draft-
ing process or the obscurity or technical complexity of the code.
A range of scholars have voiced fairness, efficiency, and moral haz-
ard concerns surrounding central features of Article 9.6 These scholars
I. Article 9 of the UCC governs debt financing that is secured by personal property. U.C.C.
§ 9-101, cmt. 1 (2002). It has revolutionized finance by providing clear rules under which lenders
can take security interests in an unprecedented range of collateral. The UCC was originally promul-
gated in 1951. The Permanent Editorial Board approved revisions to Article 9 in 1971 and again in
1999. Citations herein to the UCC are to the 2002 official text.
2. See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, U. ILL. L. F. 321, 327 (1962), quoted in Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the Uniform Law
Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569, 632
(1998).
3. The UCC is produced by joint efforts of the American Law Institute (ALl) and the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). The ALl, generally, cre-
ates restatements of law. The NCCUSL drafts uniform laws in various fields. To revise the UCC,
the ALl and NCCUSL agree to prepare a report on the article of the code in question. The report is
prepared by a study group appointed by the ALl. The study group sends its report to the ALl and
NCCUSL. The NCCUSL then appoints a drafting committee to reformulate the report into statutory
language. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1804-06 (1994)
[hereinafter Politics].
4. See infra note 6.
5. This article defines politics broadly, in terms of the dominant values and socio-political
climate that drive public policy.
6. These scholars argue that Article 9 disadvantages unsecured creditors and other third
parties affected by secured transactions. Although they arguably consent to be creditors, employees
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lament that Article 9 allows a secured creditor to recover all of the prop-
erty of a debtor when the debtor becomes insolvent, while non-adjusting
creditors like employees or tort claimants can be left with nothing.7 On
the other hand, proponents of full priority secured credit argue that Arti-
cle 9 produces efficiencies and facilitates access to essential sources of
capital for businesses. 9 Neither group can establish whether or not full
priority secured lending is efficient. Both concede that only empirical
study can answer this question and that a conclusive empirical study is
unlikely.'0 Article 9 dissenters state that even if full priority were proven
efficient it would continue to raise serious fairness and distributive jus-
generally cannot adjust their compensation to reflect the risk that a secured creditor will be paid
before them - they are "non-adjusting creditors." Tort claimants, on the other hand, do not choose to
be creditors at all - they are "non-consenting creditors." Since they are non-consenting creditors,
they also, of course, are non-adjusting creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1953-54 (1994); Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect
Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1374-76 (1997);
Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Credit in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. J. 857, 865 (1996) (analyzing economic costs of full priority secured credit
to show that full priority can result in inefficient contracting between borrowers and lenders and
other efficiency costs); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 1279, 1287-89 (1997); see Part I infra for a summary of the current state of the relationship
between Article 9 and unsecured creditors. The unsecured creditors on which this article focuses are
those who do not consent to, or adjust expected returns in response to, the creation of a secured
credit facility.
7. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics of Article 9: The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994) (stating that "security is an agreement between A and B that C take
nothing.") Arguments that full priority is justified under freedom of contract principles fail to ex-
plain why two parties - a debtor and secured creditor - should be permitted to contract away the
rights of third parties such as unsecured creditors with no chance to consent or adjust their return.
Also, the UCC explicitly overrides contractual restrictions on assignment contained in certain ac-
counts receivable, in franchise rights, licenses, and in permits. Contractual restrictions on assign-
ment do not preclude Article 9 security interests. However, secured parties may not enforce their
security interests in intangibles that contain a prohibition on assignment in a way that compromises
the interests of other parties to the intangibles. Note that I am not sure how the UCC committee
envisions determining "compromise of interest." It seems that if a party contracted to prohibit
assignment, then that party had an interest in prohibiting assignment which is compromised by an
Article 9 secured creditor's disregard of the clause. The fact that Article 9 overrides restrictions on
assignment indicates a policy decision to facilitate secured credit despite concerns of third parties.
8. "Full priority secured credit" refers to debt financing in which the lender takes as collat-
eral a "floating lien" - an assignment of all of the business's present and future assets - and has
priority over other parties with claims to those assets for the full value of its loan to the business. If
a secured creditor follows the prescribed steps for perfection of its security interest set forth in Arti-
cle 9, then it can recover its collateral before all subsequent lien creditors, including a bankruptcy
trustee. "Floating lien" is a short hand name in UCC parlance for a series of Article 9 provisions, the
most important of which are: § 9-204(c) permitting future advances in financing, § 9-323 giving
security for future advances priority as of the date of the original financing, § 9-204(a) permitting
security interests in collateral acquired after completion of a financing, and § 9-205 validating ar-
rangements under which the debtor has the right to transfer collateral. See infra Part L.A for a sum-
mary of how the 1999 revisions to Article 9 expand full priority secured credit.
9. See, e.g., James J. White, Work and Play in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089,
2089-90 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 1373-74.
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tice concerns." Supporters of full priority respond by treating such dis-
sents as futile attempts to muck the course of an unstoppable train.'
2
In the midst of this vigorous and inconclusive debate over the value
and efficiency of full priority, the revised version of Article 9 recently
adopted in all fifty states only expands secured creditors' domain. 3 In
addition, recent legislative initiatives encourage asset securitizations - a
type of transaction that can amplify the efficiency, distributive justice
and fairness concerns that drive the debate about Article 9.14 In other
words, in the face of uncertainty regarding the social value, fairness and
efficiency of Article 9 secured lending and asset securitization, lawmak-
ers consistently err in favor of capital and against non-adjusting credi-
tors.
This article does not advocate any particular reform to Article 9 or
the laws enabling securitization 1 5  It does not focus on solutions to the
problem that the law continues to encourage inequitable financing prac-
tices without pause and without any safeguards should these practices
11. See, e.g., Janger, supra note 2, at 573.
12. Note that other scholars have focused on the issue of why secured credit exists at all.
When Article 9 was introduced in 1951, people thought that secured credit served to lower interest
rates available to debtors that issue collateral. But in the late 1950s, Modigliani & Miller argued that
altering the capital structure of a corporate entity should not change its value, because creditors will
simply adjust the interest rate charged for debt and the amount they will pay for an equity interest to
reflect the riskiness of the investment. See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capi-
tal, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 276 (1958).
Therefore, debtors have no interest rate based reason to offer security to lenders. Since then, a
wealth of scholarship has addressed what is known as the "Puzzle of Secured Credit." The puzzle is:
If an entity cannot change its average costs of capital by altering its capital structure, then why do
secured creditors and debtors take on the transaction costs associated with secured transactions? To
explain the puzzle of secured credit, scholars have focused on two general possibilities: (1) secured
credit produces efficiencies, or (2) it imposes on or transfers costs to third parties. See generally
Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984).
13. Many legal scholars attribute the expansion of Article 9's full priority structure to the
nature of the UCC drafting process. Observers and participants tend to report that the UCC drafting
process focuses on technical issues in finance and law that exceed the comprehension of most citi-
zens. Secured creditors are reputed to dominate the process, driving the drafting committee to focus
only on expanding secured credit. See, e.g., Janger, supra note 2, at 631-32.
14. See infra Part L.A for a discussion of asset securitization, including the asset backed secu-
rities or "ABS" statutes recently enacted in several states.
15. Such a project, the likes of which has been undertaken by others, might include proposals:
(i) to preserve some percentage of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors, (ii) to enact a federal law
of secured transactions, (iii) to reform of the bankruptcy code to mitigate Article 9's effects, or (iv)
to advocate for creditors' insurance coupled with partial priority. A federal law of secured transac-
tions might be more accommodating of non-adjusting creditors since the drafters would not have to
worry about uniformity in the law's enactment and secured creditors' ability to undercut that uni-
formity by lobbying individual state legislatures to eliminate provisions that erode their priority. Cf
Janger, supra note 2, at 578-80. However, it is unlikely that a federal law would be any less suscep-
tible to the same influence of secured creditors and social context that affect Article 9. Regarding
reform of the bankruptcy code, see infra text accompanying notes 47-54. The idea behind creditors'
insurance is that Article 9 secured creditors could carry insurance to cover the risk that unsecured
claimants take before the secured creditors when creditors are receiving less than 100 cents on the
dollar. The costs of this insurance, however, would be passed on to borrowers, which would in-
crease costs of capital. Increased costs of capital are associated with credit constriction. The threat
of credit constriction is used as a debate stopper to block proposed reforms to Article 9. See infra
Part III.C.
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ultimately prove inefficient. 16 Rather, this article excavates the nature of
this problem and proposes an explanation for its Persistence. It presents
a certain political efficiency of Article 9 and asset securitization that
seems to overwhelm questions both of equity and of economic effi-
ciency. Specifically, this article critiques contemporary public discourse
on business and finance and presents the concept of an imagined com-
munity of investors. It does so in order to facilitate strategic thinking
about the hegemony of capitalist values 17 that permits UCC drafters and
state legislatures to treat Article 9 as a non-political, technical statute.
Critics such as Robert E. Scott, Elizabeth Warren, and Edward J.
Janger suggest that if non-adjusting creditors could understand Article
9's effects and could organize opposition, the law on secured credit
would not favor secured creditors so heavily. They seem to just con-
clude - without direct analysis - that diversity of interests among unse-
cured creditors, coupled with the nature of the UCC drafting process,
makes the costs of educating these creditors to oppose Article 9 prohibi-
tively high.
This article addresses directly the issue of why the costs of inform-
ing certain classes of unsecured creditors seem prohibitively high.
Building on the concept of imagined communities, originally developed
by Benedict Anderson, 18 this article proposes that the costs of informing
unsecured creditors about Article 9 are explained neither by the code's
technical complexity, nor by secured creditors' alleged domination of the
UCC drafting process. Rather, these costs can be understood in relation
to a socio-political climate in which deference to the needs of capital' 9 -
16. The analysis in infra Parts II & III suggests that perhaps a grassroots effort to generate
public awareness and controversy over commercial secured loans could prompt reform. Elizabeth
Warren has taken this approach in her involvement with bankruptcy reform. She makes an explicit
call for greater public awareness of commercial law in her article entitled What is a Women's Issue?
on how bankruptcy law affects women. See Warren, infra note 219, at 56. This article does not
follow Warren's prescriptive stance. Such a prescriptive project would need to account for the
descriptive reality that this article presents. Within this descriptive reality the lack of critical dis-
tance in public discourse on finance and the myth of an imagined community of investors to which
Americans belong would severely complicate any effort at consciousness-raising about commercial
secured transactions. See infra note 167 and text accompanying notes 183-84. See also Heather
Lauren Hughes, Contradictions, Open Secrets, and Feminist Faith in Enlightenment, 13 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L. J. 187 (2002) (challenging the efficacy of conscious-raising as a strategy for common
law reform).
17. Hegemony is domination by ideas; it compels people to take initiative in their own subju-
gation by subscribing to certain values. See generally ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE
PRISON NOTEBOOKS, (Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., ElecBook London 1999)
(transcribed from the edition published by Lawrence & Wishart, London 1971). The hegemony of
capitalist values refers to the psychic, social and political dominance of the ideas that (i) maximizing
material wealth is the best social objective, and (ii) inciting individuals to pursue material wealth is
the best way to maximize collective wealth. The hegemony of these views in the United States
stunts discourse in the aesthetic, social, cultural, spiritual, environmental and other consequences of
capitalism.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
19. This article uses the term "capital" to mean monetary resources and the social and politi-
cal currency associated with access to or control of monetary resources.
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driven by hopes of wealth and fear of poverty - facilitates belonging in
an imagined community of investors with which even disadvantaged
creditors identify.
Contemporary media on finance and business evidence this socio-
political climate. There is an acute lack of critical distance from busi-
nesses' financing practices that pervades journalism in the United
States.20 This lack of critical distance in public discourse on finance is a
form of disregard of the severe socio-economic inequalities among
Americans. This article proposes that the disregard of inequality in con-
temporary business reporting indicates an imagined community of capi-
talists or investors. This community of investors is imagined because its
members assume commonalities with one another despite the fact that
they may never meet or even have any contact with one another. It is a
community because those who identify with its values share a unified
field of exchange that generates comradeship despite vast differences and
inequalities among members.21 The myth of this community is that eve-
ryone belongs. Media on business and finance further the myth of op-
portunity - of an open playing field - for financial gain.22 This myth
fuels imaginings that encourage even those who struggle financially to
identify as members.
This article intends to explore to the greatest extent possible how it
is that Article 9 manages to seem apolitical. Though the absence of one
thing - critical distance in reporting on finance - cannot in a formal
sense prove the existence of another - an imagined community of inves-
tors - it is very important to more fully excavate how and why secured
lending continues to expand despite serious, unresolved policy concerns.
This article's presentation of an imagined community of investors
relates the problem of informing non-adjusting creditors to a larger ab-
sence of class consciousness in the United States.23 This article hypothe-
sizes that widespread public identification with an imagined community
of investors enables secured creditors to present unfettered expansion of
20. See infra text accompanying notes 111-58.
21. For more explanation of this article's use of the term "community," see infra Part ll.B.
22. To illustrate the false nature of these illusions, consider that according to The Federal
Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances, one half of all Americans do not own a single share of
stock even through a retirement account. The majority of those who do hold some stock have only a
trivial amount. See Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 16, Table 6.
23. A lack of class consciousness refers to failure of individuals to identify with and under-
stand the position of their class, leading to a failure to act in the best interests of their class. Class
consciousness is the self-awareness of a social class and the capacity of the class to act in its own
rational interests. It refers to the extent to which individuals are conscious of the historical tasks
their class sets out for them. The concept of class consciousness originates in socialist or Marxist
theory. See generally GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST
DIALECTICS (Rodney Livingstone trans., MIT Press 1971). Its contemporary meaning has evolved
to include class allegiances that are not confined to the strict class hierarchies and economic deter-
minism characteristic of Marx.
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access to credit as consonant with public interest both within the UCC
drafting process and before the state legislatures.
Finally, this article considers a few, leading scholars' responses to
Article 9 in light of the imagined community concept. These commercial
law scholars have failed to explore wide socio-political contexts in
analyses of why the law of secured credit continues to expand the range
of collateral and the reach of secured creditors.
James White observes that "[b]anks and other secured creditors ....
worship secured credit with apostolic zeal. The secured creditors argue
for stronger and broader security, not for weaker and narrower security.
And no one has less power in such a debate than a law professor with a
counterintuitive idea.",24 Yet, as Elizabeth Warren ("Warren") points out,
the law does draw lines to limit the scope of security.25 It does not per-
mit security interests in the form of servitude, or in human organs. 26  If
the law of secured credit were concerned only with expanding credit and
increasing secured creditors' returns, then this would not be the case.27
Warren's stance is based on the reasoning or the logic that as long as
lines are being drawn, there is no reason why they cannot be drawn to
give more protection to non-adjusting creditors. 28 But considering the
current state of public discourse on finance and the myth of an imagined
community of investors to which Americans belong,29 reasoned argu-
ments that academics deploy are not likely to move the line between en-
forceable and void or unenforceable security interests.
Part I describes recent debates over whether secured credit and asset
securitization harm non-adjusting creditors. Part II explores how and
why non-adjusting creditors have been unable to effectively participate
in the debate described in Part I. Part II describes the current state of
public discourse on finance, which is sorely missing alternative perspec-
tives on the goals and social value of businesses' financing decisions.
Part II presents the ideas that (i) the lack of critical distance in media
coverage of business indicates an imagined community of investors,
large or small, with which non-adjusting creditors identify, and (ii) this
24. White, supra note 9, at 2090-91.
25. Warren, supra note 6, at 1386-87.
26. Id. at 1386.
27. Id.
28. The Article 9 drafting committee flatly rejected a proposal by Warren to amend § 9-301 to
preserve twenty percent of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors. Warren submitted her "Carve-
Out Proposal" to the ALl in April 1996. Under Warren's proposal, a levying creditor could obtain
20% of the value of Article 9 collateral through a levy and execution under state law. Accordingly,
in bankruptcy, a trustee using her power could carve out 20% of the value of a debtor's encumbered
personal property for the benefit of the estate. At the Symposium on the Priority of Secured Debt at
Cornell Law School in 1997, Steven Harris announced that a carve-out for unsecured creditors is
"dead in the water." Warren, supra note 6, at 1374 n.3. See also William J. Woodward, Jr., The
Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Proc-
ess, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511, 1511-13 (1997).
29. See infra Part 1I.
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identification limits unsecured creditors' capacities to respond critically
to dominant financial industry practices. 30  Part III critiques several
prominent legal scholars' responses to Article 9 and the UCC drafting
process in light of the discourse, social context and imagined community
analysis presented in Part II. Part III shows how the idea of an imagined
community of capitalists with which creditors identify affects scholars'
arguments about full priority secured credit.
This article presents: (i) the inconclusive debate over secured trans-
actions and lawmakers' deference to capital, (ii) the state of public dis-
course on finance, and (iii) how some prominent legal scholars seem to
accept and ignore the larger socio-political context in which laws govern-
ing secured finance evolve. In doing so, it focuses attention on the he-
gemony of capitalist values that enables secured creditors' control over
Article 9. It is this hegemony that yields laws that consistently err in
favor of capital and against non-adjusting creditors - not just an insular
UCC drafting process or the law's technical complexity.
I. THE COMPULSION TO ERR IN FAVOR OF CAPITAL
A. Debates over Article 9 and Asset Securitization
Full priority secured lending may produce net benefits for the par-
ties involved.3" Or, it may enable debtors to pursue negative-value pro-
jects to the detriment of parties with no ability to consent or respond to
the risks imposed by the financing. Scholars' arguments on these posi-
tions remain ultimately inconclusive.
33
Proponents of Article 9 celebrate the relative ease with which con-
temporary lenders can secure loans and establish priority in a wide range
of types of collateral. 34 They praise the increased access to capital pro-
vided by Article 9's clear rules applicable to virtually all of a debtor's
personal property.35 Capital raised through secured lending can fund
value-adding projects, support employment, and contribute positively to
collective economic health.36 Proponents reason that just because some
secured loans may be inefficient or produce negative externalities, this is
30. For a comparison of this article's imagined community hypothesis to collective action
problems, see infra note 167.
31. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539,
1563-67 (2004).
32. See, e.g., Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1897-
99(1994).
33. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 1393.
34. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Secu-
rity Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2021-22 (1994).
35. See id. at 2050-52.
36. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1544.
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not cause to limit a financial practice that has become so central to con-
temporary finance.37
Yet Article 9's full priority schema, under which a secured creditor
can recover the full value of its loan before any other creditors have a
chance to recover, has raised equity concerns since the UCC was first
promulgated.3 8 These concerns were well voiced during the recent draft-
ing process to substantially revise Article 9,39 during which Lynn
LoPucki, Lucian Bebchuck and Jesse Fried, and Warren all argued for
various forms of equity cushion or carve-out to full priority. 40 These
arguments echo sentiments of Grant Gilmore himself,41 who wrote in the
comments to the 1972 version of Article 9 (of which he was a principal
architect):
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating
charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that
a commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber all his as-
sets present and future, and that for the protection not only of the bor-
rower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be
preserved. This inarticulate premise has much to recommend it.
42
Gilmore's comment, along with the more recent scholarship of LoPucki,
Warren, Bebchuck and Fried, evidences deep-seated concerns for equity
and fairness raised by full priority secured credit.43
Scholars' concerns about full priority seem well-grounded when
one considers that many unsecured creditors are either non-consenting or
non-adjusting creditors. Unlike sophisticated, institutional unsecured
creditors, non-consenting and non-adjusting creditors of a company have
37. See, e.g., Harris & Mooney, supra note 34, at 2023-24.
38. Janger, supra note 2, at 597-98.
39. Revised Article 9 was enacted in forty-six states and Washington, D.C. in 2001. It was
effective in all states by January 1, 2002.
40. See sources cited supra note 6.
41. See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981).
42. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 4 (1972) (amended 1998).
43. Of course there are many scholars who defend Article 9. Though couched in a wide range
of specific arguments, these scholars generally state that the capital raised through full priority
secured transactions benefits all creditors involved with a given debtor. This is because the proceeds
of secured transactions fund value-increasing projects, create jobs and increase productivity. See,
e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2052 (1994) (arguing that the transfer of a
security interest does not differ fundamentally from other transfers of property interests for equiva-
lent value); with respect to securitization see Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1539, 1563-67 (2004) (arguing that harms from overinvestment should be more
than offset by the benefits of securitization and that unsecured creditors themselves view securitiza-
tion as providing net value). Despite these types of arguments, whether or not secured lending is
efficient is an empirical question that is unanswered. Even if scholars could demonstrate that full
priority secured credit and asset securitization are, in fact, efficient, such a demonstration would do
nothing to assuage the fairness and equity concerns raised by LoPucki and Warren.
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no power to consent or respond to the risk of non-payment that arises
when the company assigns its assets to a secured lender.44
In the midst of this debate, the 1999 revisions to Article 9 only ex-
pand the reach of full priority secured credit.45 As Edward Janger puts it:
"Bankruptcy partisans view the recent revisions to Article 9 as shifting
previously settled allocation of property and regulatory rights in favor of
secured creditors, and against unsecured creditors ....
In addition, recent efforts to reform the federal bankruptcy code to
soften the effects of Article 9 on unsecured creditors have failed.4 7  In
July 2002, Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Illinois) and Rep. William D.
Delahunt (D-Massachusetts) introduced the Employee Abuse Prevention
Act of 2002.48 This bill was an effort to enable the bankruptcy trustee to
include assets assigned to a perfected secured creditor in the bankruptcy
estate under certain circumstances. 49 It was packaged as a reform to pro-
tect workers and retirees from corporate misconduct.50 The Durbin-
Delahunt bill suffered an onslaught of criticism from organizations such
as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
44. Note that Article 9 defenders contest the assertion that non-adjusting creditors are hurt by
full priority. They argue that non-adjusting trade creditors receive the second highest returns of any
creditor in bankruptcy (second to secured bank creditors). With respect to employees, they cite that
certain wage claims are given priority as administrative expenses in bankruptcy and that any chapter
11 debtor has to pay ordinary wage claims in order to keep going and reorganize. However, these
assertions do not fully address the equity concerns raised by full priority. Why should non-adjusting
creditors always take second to secured creditors? A debtor's obligation to pay wage claims and to
continue to pay wages during reorganization does nothing to protect creditors who lose their jobs or
have unpaid claims because the bankruptcy estate is not sufficient to pay them. Again, whether
these unsecured creditors are in fact hurt by full priority can only be established with empirical
research that currently does not exist. Further, whether full priority is efficient regardless of con-
cerns for equitable treatment of non-adjusting creditors is also not known. This article presents the
political efficiency of full priority regardless of its economic efficiency. This political efficiency
might perhaps explain why such research appears unlikely to be done.
45. The revisions expand secured lenders' reach by permitting security interests in several
new types of collateral. For example, old Article 9 only covered deposit accounts insofar as they
constituted proceeds of other collateral. New Article 9 generally permits security interests in deposit
accounts as original collateral. Old Article 9 only applied to sales of receivables arising from goods
or services transactions (accounts). See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(D), 9-104, 9-102(a)(29) (1951). Old
Article 9 did not cover rights to payment arising from other transactions. Revised Article 9 covers a
broader spectrum of sales of receivables. The definition of "accounts" is expanded to include pay-
ment obligations arising from the sale, lease or license of all kinds of tangible and intangible prop-
erty. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2002). Revised Article 9 also covers commercial tort claims, sofi-
ware, and letter of credit rights, all of which were excluded under old Article 9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-
102(a)(75), 9-102(a)(13), 9-102(a)(51), 9-107 (2002).
46. Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOzo L. REv. 1759, 1760
(2004).
47. These failures are disturbing in light of recent empirical research showing that by the time
a company enters bankruptcy it likely has many poorly adjusting creditors. See Elizabeth Warren &
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L.
Rev. 1197, 1202-03 (2005).
48. S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002).
49. See Statement of the Honorable William D. Delahunt of Massachusetts Regarding the




(NCCUSL), The Bond Market Association, The Depository Trust and
Clearing Corporation, and The Options Clearing Corporation.51 Its spon-
sors withdrew the bill in early September, 2002.52
Even if the federal bankruptcy code could be reformed to success-
fully protect non-adjusting creditors when companies enter the bank-
ruptcy system, such a reform would not help unsecured creditors who are
adversely affected by secured credit outside of the bankruptcy system.
Many secured lenders are concerned primarily with the control over a
debtor that they gain by taking an Article 9 lien - not their priority in the
event of bankruptcy. 53 A secured loan agreement contains covenants -
negative and affirmative - and sets forth events of default. These cove-
nants can include detailed criteria for debtor performance and behavior.
The notice and remedy provisions set forth in covenants permit a secured
creditor to police a debtor's behavior and even to step in and take certain
actions on behalf of the debtor if it fails to comply.
5 4
Scholars have argued that the control that secured creditors gain
over debtors benefits all creditors and equity holders as well.55 The se-
cured creditors are looking to be repaid, not to deal with a bankruptcy
trustee. 56 For example, Scott contends that monitoring efforts of a se-
cured creditor may also benefit unsecured creditors because a floating
lien creditor expects to be repaid out of the proceeds of the business, not
out of the collateral per se.57
However, Ronald Mann responds effectively that a secured credi-
tor's interests and direction to a company will not necessarily coincide
with unsecured creditors' interests.58 For example, what is good for the
company from a secured lender's perspective may be very harmful to
employees. Mann finds that secured creditors focus on the enhanced
leverage that security gives them to enforce payment. 59 A measure that
increases the likelihood that one creditor will be repaid may increase the
51. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death
of the Avoidance Powers Under Section 103 of the Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Think-
ing?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1831-32 (2004) (arguing that the Durbin-Delahunt bill was much
more expansive in its attempt to avoid the interests of secured creditors in bankruptcy than the bill's
sponsors had indicated).
52. Id. at 1831.
53. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Secured Lending and Its Uncertain Future, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1789, 1795 (2004) ("As long as the security interest is perfected outside of bankruptcy's prefer-
ence window, everyone else must take a back seat.").
54. For an anecdotal example of how a secured creditor can control a debtor, see Douglas G.
Baird's discussion of how Warnaco's lenders directed it to appoint a new officer. Baird, supra note
53, at 1792-96.
55. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
901,903-04 (1986).
56. See, e.g., id. at 965.
57. ld. at 931.
58. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625,
654-55 (1997).
59. Id. at 649.
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risk of nonpayment to other creditors, as secured lenders do not account
for third party costs of secured credit in exercising their leverage to en-
force payment.6 °
The multi-trillion dollar securitization or structured finance industry
raises concerns for unsecured creditors that make plain old Article 9 se-
cured lending appear equitable in contrast.61 Recent debate over the effi-
ciency and fairness of asset securitization is similar to the debate over
full priority secured lending. 62 Proponents claim that securitization actu-
ally reduces costs for companies.63 Dissenters assert that the gains en-
joyed by some parties to a securitization result in losses to others. 64
Asset securitization is the practice of selling assets to a special pur-
pose entity (SPE) and then having the SPE either (i) assign the assets to
secure a loan that will enjoy a better rate than the originator or seller
could get, or (ii) sell securities backed by the pool of assets held by the
SPE.65 In either case, the costs of capital for the seller are reduced66 be-
cause once the assets are transferred to the SPE they are isolated from
other creditors of the seller. 67 The SPE is set-up to be remote from the
seller's bankruptcy, so that an investor or lender to the SPE does not
even need to participate in proceedings in the event of the seller's bank-
ruptcy. The SPE's assets are simply not part of the bankruptcy estate
since they were sold (and not just assigned as collateral for a loan).68
This type of financing raises some obvious questions. How does
the originator on the one hand sell assets such that they are no longer part
of the originator's estate, and yet on the other hand enjoy the proceeds of
a loan or investment in the SPE? The current law on how to respond to
60. Id.; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEx. L.
REv. 795, 818-19 (2004) (stating that a secured lender with a floating lien will not represent the
interests of unsecured creditors).
61. Secured lending and asset securitization have traditionally been treated like industries
with coterminous interests. Asset securitization or structured finance was viewed as a type of se-
cured financing. However, recent legislative efforts to isolate securitizers from the true sale doctrine
and even from Article 9 requirements indicate that the two types of financings have interests that are
more divergent than it once appeared. See Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25
CARDOZO L. REv. 1759, 1760-62 (2004).
62. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 6, at 1393.
63. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 55, at 931-33.
64. See Lynn LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 23-30; Lynn LoPucki, The
Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55, 59-67 (1999) (arguing that securitiza-
tion is a negative-sum game).
65. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLERS HANDBOOK: ASSET
SECURITIZATION 2 (1997), http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/assetsec.pdf (for a definition of asset
securitization).
66. Some commentators claim that asset securitization provides as much as a 150 basis point
spread over basic secured lending. See Janger supra note 46 at 1769 (citing Lowell Bryan, The
Risks, Potential and Promise of Securitization, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 171-73 (Leon T.
Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996)).
67. See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 3-5 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996)
68. See II U.S.C. § 541 (2005).
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this question differs depending on the state in which the originator is
located. In addition, model Article 9 itself gives inconsistent directions
on whether courts can treat a transaction that the parties call a sale as a
secured loan in a securitization context. 69 Section 9-318(a) states that "a
debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or
promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collat-
eral sold., 70  This provision is meant to give securitizers assurance that
securitized assets will be deemed sold to the SPE as long as the parties
characterize the transfer from the originator to the SPE as a "sale". 7'
Yet, § 9-318(b) directs courts to look to the substance of a transaction to
distinguish a sale from a secured loan. 72 It finds - in contrast to subsec-
tion (a) - that a sale without perfection by the "buyer" leaves the seller
(or debtor) with an interest in the assets sufficient to come within reach
of the seller's creditors.73
Securitizers have insisted for some years that provisions like § 9-
318(a) - not to mention the ABS statutes discussed below - are not nec-
essary to establish that an SPE has purchased the assets it holds.74 As
long as certain true sale criteria recognized by courts and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board are met, they argue, a sale has occurred and
courts should not override the parties' intentions and find a secured
loan.75 A transaction that meets the recognized standards for a sale can
nonetheless permit the originator to offer some recourse to the SPE.
However, the inclusion of § 9-318(a) in revised Article 9 and the passage
of the ABS statutes indicate that asset securitizers may harbor doubt as to
the legal status of their transactions.76
69. Texas and Louisiana have enacted versions of Article 9 that function like ABS statutes to
resolve this inconsistency. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2003); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.109(e) (Vernon 2004).
70. U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (2002). Note that this section applies to sales of accounts, chattel
paper, payment intangibles or promissory notes. Asset securitization itself is not limited to these
types of assets or collateral. Just about any type of Article 9 collateral can be securitized. However,
accounts and other payment rights are the most commonly pooled and securitized assets.
71. U.C.C § 9-318 cmt. 2 (2002).
72. U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (2002).
73. Id.
74. See Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287,288-90 (2001).
74. Id. at 288.
76. See In re LTV Steel, Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). In this case Judge
Bodoh issued a preliminary opinion that ordered the "secured lenders to turnover to Debtor the cash
proceeds of the inventory and receivables" that the "Debtor," LTV Steel, Inc., had transferred to two
SPEs which in turn had entered into secured credit facilities with several lenders. This case sent
shock waves through the securitization industry, as Judge Bodoh's opinion found that LTV Steel had
an equitable interest in assets that it had sold to SPEs pursuant to an asset securitization. The opin-
ion was preliminary and issued by the bankruptcy court - not an appellate court - and it was nulli-
fied by the fact that LTV gave up its challenge to the securitization shortly after the opinion was
issued. See James J. White, Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization: Panel 1: Asset
Securitization and Secured Lending: CHUCK AND STEVE'S PECCADILLO, 25 CARDOzO L. REV.
1743 (2004) (describing In re LTV Steel, Inc. and the inconsistency between §§ 9-318(a) and (b)).
Nonetheless, In re LTV Steel, Inc. has been the subject of much controversy and part of the inspira-
tion for the statutes discussed in the text accompanying note 80 infra.
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In most jurisdictions parties and courts faced with a challenge to
their asset securitization, look to the "true sale" doctrine to determine
whether a transaction is a sale or a loan. This doctrine, gleaned from the
law of contract and property, looks to the economic substance of a trans-
action - not just its characterization by the parties. 7 It does not draw
hard and fast lines as to when a sale has occurred. Rather, courts are
directed to assess whether, in a given transaction, the buyer has assumed
the risks and benefits of ownership or instead merely advanced capital in
exchange for a guaranteed return.79
Some jurisdictions have passed asset backed securities statutes
(ABS statutes) to facilitate securitization. These statutes are meant to
override the true sale doctrine and the murkiness of Article 9.80 The
ABS statutes state that a sale made in the context of a securitization
transaction shall be treated as a true sale regardless of economic sub-
stance, so long as the documents call the transaction a "sale. 81 The most
prominent such statute is Delaware's Asset-Backed Securities Facilita-
tion Act, which states that assets transferred in a securitization transac-
tion "shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets or rights of the
transferor.,
82
Asset securitization can raise some serious concerns for unsecured
creditors of the originator. Edward J. Janger points out that a traditional
secured lender cannot avoid state law rules surrounding foreclosure.83
They must comply with Article 9's rules for perfection, which provide
notice of their interest to third parties.84 Property that is assigned to a
secured lender is still part of a debtor's bankruptcy estate until the se-
cured party establishes its priority and takes its collateral or is given ade-
quate protection by the bankruptcy trustee. 85 Asset securitization, on the
other hand, enables companies to move assets out of reach of the bank-
ruptcy estate all together.86 Furthermore, companies operating under an
ABS statute can accomplish this without having to provide any notice to
third parties.87
77. See Stephen J. Lubben, Beyond True Sales: Securitization and Chapter 11, 1 N.Y.U. J. L.
& Bus. 89, 95-97 (2004).
78. Id. at 96.
79. Id.
80. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-10A-2(a)(1) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2701A-2703A
(2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(e) (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1109.75 (2005); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-425, 53-426 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-1-10 (2005); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.109(e) (2005).
81. For a discussion of the differences among these various statutes, see Janger supra note 46,
at 1764-68.
82. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A(1).
83. See Janger, supra note 46, at 1767.
84. Id.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2005).




Those who extol the virtues of asset securitization remind naysayers
that the originator sells the assets to be securitized to an SPE for cash or
other consideration in a sale transaction. 8 Therefore, the creditors of the
originator should not complain. The assets have not been assigned to a
prior creditor, but exchanged for other assets - most often cash - of
equivalent value. Securitization's skeptics are not placated by this re-
sponse. Once the originator's assets are exchanged for cash, the origina-
tor can dispose of that cash in any way it deems appropriate. 89 For ex-
ample, the originator could pay dividends to shareholders with the cash,
circumventing creditors with claims that would have been enforceable
against the assets sold to the SPE. The investors in the SPE have no in-
centive to monitor an originator once the true sale transaction is com-
plete. 90
There are at least some securitizations and some secured loans that
are inefficient. A financing is inefficient when a debtor or originator
uses the proceeds in a way that reduces the firm's value.91 Scholars can-
not prove whether these inefficient transactions: (i) represent a small
exception to a norm of value-adding transactions, or (ii) reveal dubious
incentives that make these types of financing attractive to businesses in
the first place. 92 In other words, the fact that securitizations and full pri-
ority secured loans permit businesses to shift costs to non-consenting
third parties may be the reason for their popularity.
B. Common Sense Deference to Capital in the Face of Inconclusive De-
bate
Proponents of full priority and asset securitization concede that they
cannot demonstrate that these modes of financing are efficient, nor do
they offer satisfying responses to concerns about fairness and distributive
justice that these transactions raise. In the face of this uncertainty, recent
legislative trends only encourage asset securitization. 93 Similarly, law-
makers seem to have ignored concerns about non-adjusting creditors
raised by LoPucki and Warren, Bebchuck and Fried during debates over
reform of Article 9.
88. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN.
L. REv. 1 (1999) (responding to Lynn LoPucki's assertion that asset securitization constitutes judg-
ment proofing by the originator); but see Lynn LoPucki, The Irrefutable Logic of Judgment Proof-
ing: A Reply to Professor Schwarcz, 52 STAN. L. REv. 55, 59-67 (1999).
89. See Schwarcz, supra note 88, at 18-20.
90. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76
TEx. L. REv. 595 (1998).
91. For an explanation of overinvestment, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron,
25 CARDozo L. REv. 1539, 1555-57 (2004).
92. Id. at 1553-55.
93. Another example of this trend is the attempt of securitizers to insert into the bankruptcy
code a safe harbor provision for sales made pursuant to a securitization. See Janger, supra note 46,
at 1776.
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Many scholars who observe this trend explain it in terms of com-
mon sense. Consider William H. Widen's common sense approach to
his Article 9 scholarship:
I can design models in which secured credit is efficient and I can de-
sign models in which it is not efficient. Thus, in my view, what you
have is really just a political choice. Once a political choice is made
as to which social relationships to allow (e.g., absolute priority se-
cured credit), I am in favor of whatever rules let me create the social
relationship at lowest cost without really worrying too much about
whether we should have a rule that allows the relationship to form in
the first place.
94
To whom does Widen concede the political choice to permit full prior-
ity? Widen finds that absent more certain evidence of particular harms to
non-adjusting creditors, the debate over efficiency is undecideable. As
long as this debate is undecidable, efficiency should not be a primary
consideration in addressing questions of grand reform to Article 9. It
does not make sense to focus on efficiency in a political climate commit-
ted to expand access to capital through full priority.
Similarly, James J. White finds debate over the efficiency or fair-
ness of Article 9 largely irrelevant so long as businesses and financial
institutions continue to passionately embrace full priority.95 In stating his
dismissal of any inefficiency claims, he writes:
I conclude that [Article 9] is probably efficient .... The pervasive-
ness of security not only in modem industrial society but also in more
primitive and ancient societies supports the argument. Never has se-
curity been required by law; always it has been chosen by debtors
and creditors. Were it inefficient, why and how has it persisted for so
long, in so many ways, in so many places? 96
White chooses to ignore obvious responses here, including the response
that debtors chose secured credit precisely because it enables them to
transfer costs to non-adjusting creditors. He speaks of secured credit
generally without recognizing that Article 9's absolute priority schema is
relatively new and has been highly controversial. Further, he implies
that Article 9 is simply the latest evolution of a longstanding financial
practice, rather than a creation of legal scholars and lawmakers fulfilling
a political commitment to capital.
94. E-mail from William H. Widen to Heather L. Hughes (June 14, 2005) (on file with au-
thor); see also William H. Widen, Lord of the Liens: Towards Greater Efficiency in Secured Syndi-
cated Lending, 25 CARDoZO L. REv. 1577, 1641 (2004).
95. See White, supra note 9.
96. Id. at 2089-90.
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II. CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON FINANCE
What explains lawmakers' consistent deference to secured creditors
in the face of unresolved concerns over full priority and asset securitiza-
tion? Does the public offer an opinion or consensus on these transactions
that justifies this deference? What enables some legal scholars to regard
the political choice to permit certain relationships among non-adjusting
creditors and powerful investors as settled, such that it is beyond the
scope of the debate?
This section takes up these questions by exploring the current state
of public discourse on finance and presenting the concept of an imagined
community of capitalists with which non-adjusting creditors identify.
This section analyzes the socio-political context that seems to paralyze
lawmakers and non-adjusting creditors who might otherwise oppose the
legislative trend towards expanding secured lending and asset securitiza-
tion. It presents a political efficiency enjoyed by Article 9 and the ABS
statutes that seems to simply overwhelm issues of economic efficiency or
equity.
The reporters for the drafting committee that completed revisions to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1999 have declared Article
9 to be "the ... most publicly vetted uniform law project to date." 97 Yet,
not surprisingly, there are few references to Article 9 in the past fifteen
years in any serials of general distribution, even during the late nineties
and in 2001 when the law was overhauled and the revised version
adopted by states. 98 Why is an overhaul of the rules governing secured
debt finance, a major source of capital for business, absent from main-
stream business reporting?
97. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC
Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1400 (1999). By "publicly
vetted" Harris and Mooney may mean passed by many legislatures without dissent or material alter-
nation. Commentators such as Lynn LoPucki reject the assertion that revised Article 9 was publicly
vetted in the sense of being crafted in response to a range of commentary.
98. This statement is based upon the following three searches: (1) LexisNexis, News &
Business, News All (English, full text), search terms: Article 9; Nexis, News & Business, News,
Major Papers, date restricted 01/01/94 through 01/01/03, search terms: "article 9" and (UCC or
"uniform commercial code"); (2) LexisNexis, News & Business, News, Major Papers, search terms:
"article 9" and (UCC or "uniform commercial code"); and (3) LexisNexis, News & Business, News,
Magazine Stories, Combined, search terms: "article 9" and (u.c.c. or "uniform commercial code").
For an analysis of the references to Article 9 that these searches produces, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 124-34. In addition to the few substantive references analyzed in infra Part ILA, the
newspaper searches produced the following results: reference to Article 9 in obituaries of a com-
mercial law practitioner and UCC advocate, announcements of professional conferences for lawyers
and business groups on the changes to Article 9, alumni notes citing graduates who co-authored a
book on the UCC, and other passing references. Again, in addition to the references analyzed in Part
ILA, magazine coverage was limited to reports on Article 9 appearing in the American Bar Associa-
tion magazine and other publications geared towards industry participants such as Business Credit,
The Bond Buyer, ABA Banking Journal, American Banker, Purchasing, American Business Law
Journal, The Journal of Lending and Credit Risk Management, and various state bar journals. The
coverage of Article 9 in these publications is devoted almost entirely to describing the revisions to
Article 9 and how the revisions affect various, everyday business practices.
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Homer Kripke finds that Article 9 is too complex for widespread
understanding and that it lacks "popular appeal." He states, "The Code
was 'lawyers' legislation,' largely outside the potential understanding of
most members of state legislatures .. . .Difficult legislation like this
without popular appeal can seldom be passed without a broad consensus
of agreement of interested parties." 99  Banks, finance companies and
other private trade groups, in Kripke's view, were the universe of inter-
ested parties., 00
Kripke's statement that most state legislators - not to mention the
general public - cannot understand Article 9 due to its technical diffi-
culty continues to pervade writings on the UCC. Yet, the bankruptcy
code, which is arguably more technical and complex than Article 9, re-
ceives attention in popular sources.' 0 ' In fact, media representations
have impacted the legislative process.102 Melissa Jacoby has analyzed
how media treatment of bankruptcy issues has affected the course of
Congress's recent bankruptcy reform efforts. 10 3  Some scholars reason
that if unsecured creditors could understand their relationship to the law
of secured transactions they might be able to organize to oppose full pri-
ority secured credit. 10 4 The critique of business journalism that follows
begins to excavate the dynamics of the information asymmetry that per-
sists between secured creditors and third parties affected by Article 9.
Many scholars have studied the role of media in shaping public dis-
course and policy. 105 News media have a documented agenda-setting
power.l°6 Some even refer to the media as the "fourth branch" of Ameri-
can government. 1 7 This article accepts these findings about the power of
news media and applies them to media on business and finance. How-
ever, the approach here to the relationship between media and law is
99. See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial
Code, U. ILL. L. F. 321, 327 (1962), quoted in Edward J. Janger, supra note 2, at 632.
100. See Kripke, supra note 99.
101. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41




104. See infra Part III.B.
105. See generally GARY C. WOOD, PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICAL MEDIA 237
(1997) (asserting that we cannot assess the forms of American political discourse without consider-
ing popular media); Robert H. Giles, The Media and Government Regulation in the Great Tradition
of Muckraking, 11 KANS. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 567, 570 (2002) (describing the formative role of news
media in the development of policy and legislation); SIDNEY KRAUS & DENNIS DAVIS, THE EFFECTS
OF MASS COMMUNICATION ON POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1976) (discussing the centrality of media to
policy making); TIMOTHY E. COOK, GOVERNING WITH THE NEWS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION (1998) (arguing that news is a political institution).
106. See Everett Rogers et al., A Paradigmatic History of Agenda-Setting Research, in DO THE
MEDIA GOVERN? POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND REPORTERS IN AMERICA 225 (Shanto Iyengar &
Richard Reeves, eds., 1997); Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Func-
tion of the Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176, 176-85 (1972).
107. See DOUGLASS CATER, THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 (1959) (describing
news media's power); Jacoby, supra note 101, at 1093.
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different from most prior approaches. This article attempts to identify
and explore the causes and implications of an absence of reporting on
commercial law and an absence of journalistic perspective on finance. It
proposes that these absences indicate the presence of a dominant, imag-
ined community of capitalists that accepts obedience of finance experts'
rules and predictions as consonant with public interest. 
08
A. Business So-Called Journalism and the Reign of Finance Experts
Contemporary discourse on finance bears resemblance to the views
of religion in sixteenth century Italy presented in Carlo Ginzburg's book,
The Cheese and the Worms. 109 Ginzburg features a miller who is perse-
cuted for having his own opinions about the Bible in a society where
reading and interpreting the Bible is the sole province of an educated
clergy.110 Imagine a non-executive employee of a publicly traded com-
pany looking at his or her employer's disclosures on the Securities and
Exchange Commission website and then raising a stink about executive
decisions to assign the employer's assets to a secured creditor, or about
the employer's current loan to value ratio.
Many unsecured creditors likely do not even identify with the con-
cept that they are creditors of a company that have a stake in the rules
governing secured finance. Businesses can fail at their attempts to in-
crease wealth for society as a whole, but the financing mechanisms and
structures that they employ along the way are not directly critiqued. Sto-
ries of bankrupt entities that have left their employees pension-less and
their unsecured creditors without recourse abound. But these stories
generally decline to mention - let alone critique or analyze - the financ-
ings that preceded the loss of pensions. Companies' financing decisions
are only criticized when they involve fraudulent or criminal dealings.
Stories that portray businesses simply using Article 9 to assign their as-
sets to secured creditors, rendering themselves judgment proof, to obtain
loans that they can then use to engage in risky behavior, are virtually
impossible to find.
The scenario of a secured creditor taking all of the assets of a debtor
leaving tort claimants and employees out of luck is simple and provoca-
tive enough for widespread consumption. The image of a family forced
from home after foreclosure of a mortgage is culturally salient. Stories
about consumer debt and the consequences of credit extended to indi-
viduals are common. Yet, stories that critique the effects on unsecured
108. Again, in a formal sense, the absence of one thing does not prove the existence of another.
However, it is very important to explore to the greatest extent possible how a law with controversial
distributive consequences stays under the radar of public opinion.
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creditors of businesses' decisions to finance their operations or projects
with secured credit are not in the news.
Popular writing indicates that Americans feel a collective, personal
stake in businesses' financing options. Bill Wasik of Harper's Magazine
states,
"[Business writing today] is the serialized fiscal bildungsroman of
you, the reader: you invest your 401k, . . . the reader-investor be-
comes, implicitly, the protagonist.... That crooked financier has ab-
sconded with your money .... Try, for example, to imagine a col-
umn in The New Republic devoted to how to contact one's congress-
man, .... or Rolling Stone with fold-out bass tablature."' l
Finance experts' learned and moneyed status authorizes them to shape
the law on secured finance. But these experts are not speaking in an iso-
lated UCC drafting forum that disregards social context. Rather, their
task - offering businesses as much debt financing as possible - is of
wide-ranging, personal relevance to the constituencies of the state legis-
latures to which they appeal. Scholars like LoPucki and Warren have
tried to persuade UCC drafters and state legislatures to reform the law on
secured credit. In doing so, they are speaking to representatives of a
public that feels personally dependent on the business growth associated
with secured transactions.
The protagonist of a story is its leading character or principal figure.
In reporting on business and finance the reader becomes the implied pro-
tagonist in the sense that this reporting implicitly casts the reader's own
financial position as the sine qua non of relevance. The reader is pre-
sumed to be a participant in capital markets or real estate markets. Main-
stream media report the activities of various enterprises with a view to-
wards providing information that will enable the implied protagonist to
understand market trends and evolving business practices in order to
protect and enhance her own position. 112
For example, go to the internet homepage for National Public Ra-
dio's popular Marketplace program produced by American Public Me-
dia."l3 Marketplace assumes its listeners to be willing participants in the
activity of capitalism. The following examples are taken from that
page's content on January 11, 2005. First, notice that we see weather
symbols next to each of DOW, NASDAQ, and S&P. On January 11 we
see three little clouds indicating that market performance is negative."
4
111. Bill Wasik, Dismal Beat: The March of Personal-Finance Journalism, HARPER'S MAG.,
Mar. 1, 2003, at 82. (critiquing the narrow range of perspectives and lack of journalistic distance in
reporting on finance and business) (hereinafter Wasik, Dismal Beat).
112. See Wasik, supra note 111.





These symbols naturalize the market. In the world of Marketplace, ma-
jor markets are like the weather: constantly relevant to daily life, larger
than all of us, and part of the forces of nature.
Further, just above the weather report, we have a headline that
reads: "Playing economics with China."'"1 5 Apparently economics is a
game we can "play." Yet games are played by players who consent to
participate and know the rules of the game. Can we speak of economics
as a "game" when its alleged players are nations compelled to reckon
with one another, and whose decisions have grave, life-long conse-
quences for many who are never permitted to play? We learn in the ac-
companying blurb that "while the U.S. and Chinese economies have fu-
eled the global economic growth of the past decade, commentator Robin
Bew believes the fun won't last in 2005. '116 Global economic growth
sure is "fun" - if, of course, you are an investor who profits from expan-
sions in production and not an under-compensated worker whose labor
enables growth the benefits of which accrue primarily to others.
Move now to CNN.com. 117 It appears that CNN.com does not regu-
larly devote journalistic efforts to reporting on business and finance.
Instead, it has partnered with Money magazine to create "CNNMoney" -
a page of "news" provided by Money for CNN's audience. 18 As one
might guess from its title, CNNMoney does not venture any reporting
that questions the objectives or social consequences of business or fi-
nance. Instead, we read stories with the same presumption of the reader
as protagonist, as capitalist participant. A headline alerts us to "The dark
side of the boom."' 19 The boom here is rising real estate prices and the
dark side is that "as home values rise, so do property taxes."'' 20 We are
given "seven tips for easing the sting."' 12 1 This story projects the image
of a readership of home owners. 22 The bad news is that the reader has to
deal with a higher tax bill. 23 The "dark side of the boom" for those un-
able to afford a home - namely, that as prices rise this goal falls farther
and farther out of reach - does not receive attention. Part II.B explores
how this presumed readership functions as an imagined community of
capitalists with which many unsecured creditors identify.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., CNN.com Home Page, http://www.cnn.com.
118. See, e.g., CNNMoney Home Page, http://money.cnn.com.
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Reporting that mentions commercial law is sparse, 124 and the report-
ing that does exist tends to further the image of the reader as investor-
protagonist. For example, two stories that reference the UCC in the New
York Times inform readers who own homes in co-op buildings about
rules for making loans to the Co-ops. 125 A question-and-answer column
in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch references Article 9 as it responds to con-
cerns of a reader who has sold a car to a friend who has failed to pay in
accordance with their agreement. 126  Finally, a Seattle Times business
columnist reports on a local bank that plans to profit from changes to
Article 9 by offering electronic search and filing services. 12 7 This article
simply describes the bank's plan to offer filing services.128  This story
appears to inform investors of the filing service in hopes of receiving
their business.
Defying the general trend is one story from the Chicago Tribune
that reports on unsecured trade creditors who lost money doing business
with companies who assigned assets to a secured lender that subse-
quently foreclosed on the assets. 129 In this rare exposure of the effects of
the UCC on smaller unsecured creditors, freelance reporter Joanne
Cleaver reports that some venture capital firms convert their failing eq-
uity investments to secured debt and then foreclose on their loans.
130
Cleaver presents a photographer who is owed $1,500 and will not be
paid, and a visual communications firm that was forced to write off a
debt of $177,000 and fire six of its nine employees. Both losses are ex-
plicitly attributed to the status of secured creditors under the law.
13 1
Cleaver explains that "one technique the venture firms are using is to
extend a bridge loan to the firm and then foreclose on it under Article 9
124. See supra note 55. Two stories in the Financial Times (London) report on proposed
changes to collateral security rules in England and reference Article 9 as a successful model statute.
See A. H. Hermann, Business Law: Credit and the Quickening Pace of Change, FIN. TIMES, July 10,
1986 at 10, available at 1986 WLNR 575736; Editorial Comment, Creditors in a Legal Jungle, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1983. at 14, available at 1983 WLNR 309783.
125. See Jay Romano, YOUR HOME: New Rules on Loans for Co-ops, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2001, § 11, at 5; Jay Romano, YOUR HOME: Share-Loan Payoff in a Co-op, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1999, § 11, at 5. LexisNexis maintains in its commercial law database a file called "The New York
Times - Commercial Law Stories." However, a search of this file for "Article 9" yields no results.
A search for "unsecured w/s creditor!" is also fruitless; "security interest" produces the two stories
by Jay Romano cited above. A search for "uniform commercial code" yields several stories which
indicate that The New York Times is aware that the UCC exists, but does not regard it as fodder for
critical discussion. The lack of reporting on commercial law that appears in this file may result from
the way in which LexisNexis maintains the file, rather than from a dearth of attention to the subject
in The New York Times generally. The fruitlessness of similar searches in the general news database
corroborates the accuracy of the file-specific searches.
126. See John Roska, Signed Papers Must Include "Security Interest" to Repossess, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 2002, at 2.
127. See Stephen H. Dunphy, The Newsletter, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at C 1.
128. Id.
129. See Joanne Cleaver, New Debt-free Life for Shaky Firms; Venture Capitalists are Employ-
ing Legal and Financial Tools to Salvage Investors' Money, Often Leaving Smaller Creditors in the





of the Uniform Commercial Code."' 132 She makes clear that secured
creditors are first to be paid when a company is in trouble and that
smaller, unsecured creditors get only what is left over.' 
33
Cleaver's story does provide a journalistic perspective on business
practices. It presents a few companies using Article 9 to shift assets to
secured creditors and out of the hands of non-adjusting creditors. Unfor-
tunately, it is one 980-word piece in a huge volume of reporting on busi-
ness and finance that generally fails to report on companies' financing
practices that harm non-adjusting creditors. Also, the article's subject is
limited to predatory "venture capitalists." Cleaver implies that the fi-
nancing practice she describes occurs when these aggressive speculators
are looking to salvage investors' money using any and all available
means. 134 The fact that banks and other investors routinely take full pri-
ority security interests in the assets of businesses to the potential detri-
ment of various non-adjusting creditors is still missing from the main-
stream media landscape.
Plenty of reporting informs us on the fall-out of financial failures.
Stories abound about lay-offs, about decimated pension funds and irre-
sponsible accounting, about corrupt executives, about consolidation of
major enterprises. Again, these stories assume the reader is an investor.
As Wasik observes, these stories feel relevant because the reader's own
retirement funds might be involved. 1
35
Why do the media decline to report thoroughly and critically on fi-
nancings that affect the courses that businesses take and the implications
of those courses for a range of interested parties? Why do the media
ignore recent, major changes to the law on secured finance that will ag-
gravate the effect of financial failure on labor and other non-consenting
or non-adjusting creditors? Stories about lay-offs or unemployment after
bankruptcy read like "people stories" - stories about individuals and
communities - not stories appropriate for the financial pages. The "peo-
ple" will want to hear about a community's hardship. But are they up to
hearing about the structure and legal rights that make up the financings
that result in community hardship? No, no - that's way too complex and
technical. The fact that a statute exists that enables companies to assign
all assets to secured lenders, placing them beyond the reach of other
creditors goes unmentioned in the people-friendly, community story.
These stories do not question the validity or desirability of the enterprise
(created and enabled by statute) concerned solely with profit. Busi-





135. Wasik, supra note 111.
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LTV Steel, Inc. is an example of a large employer that entered into
several secured debt financings, went into bankruptcy several times, and
finally shut down, leaving many thousands of retirees' pensions and
health benefits in jeopardy. 136 Coverage of the bankruptcies and eventual
shutdown of LTV Steel included numerous community interest stories.
137
Many of these stories do not even mention the financings that enabled
secured creditors to take LTV's assets ahead of workers and retirees de-
pendent on company health care benefits and pensions.1 38  The stories
that do mention secured debt and explain that workers and retirees can-
not get paid until secured lenders are paid in full report this fact with no
explanation or critique. 39 The idea that certain laws create and protect
secured creditors' rights - let alone that workers could organize to op-
pose the one-sided formulation of such laws - does not appear in the
reporting.
Granted, cash did flow to LTV companies with employees and other
creditors as a result of LTV's securitizations1 40 Whether this cash flow
should have adequately protected workers - and why it ultimately did not
- raises more questions the press declined to explore.
One reporter, Peter Krouse, does venture an explanation of how
LTV securitized its accounts receivable in the Cleveland Plain Dealer's
coverage of In re LTV Steel Company.141 This controversial and well-
publicized case considered the status of assets sold to a bankruptcy re-
mote special purpose vehicle for purposes of securitization1 42 In this
case the bankruptcy court allowed LTV Steel to use funds collected from
assets it had previously "sold" to a special purpose vehicle. 43 Krouse
explains the securitization of LTV's receivables as follows:
LTV Sales bought the accounts receivable of LTV Steel and used
them as collateral to borrow from Abbey National .... LTV Steel
wanted to borrow money at a lower rate, but the lender, Abbey Na-
tional, was concerned about repayment. When LTV switched its col-
lateral to LTV Sales Finance, that sheltered Abbey from LTV Steel's
troubles.'"
Krouse keeps his description to a bare minimum. His willingness to ex-
plain structured finance to his lay readership is refreshing, but Krouse
136. See, e.g., Jim Weiker, Steel Era, and a Way of Life, Ends in Cleveland, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 9, 2001, at 1A.
137. See, e.g., id.
138. See, e.g., id.
139. See, e.g., Jennifer Scott Cimperman, LTV's Court Battle: Who Will Survive, Who Will be
Shuttered, CLE. PLAIN DEALER, July 7, 2002, at A7; Peter Krouse, British Bank Cries Foul in LTV
Ruling, CLE. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 2, 2001, at IC.
140. Cimperman, supra note 139.
141. Krouse, supra note 139; 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
142. In re LTV, 274 B.R. at 285-87.
143. Id. at 278-81.
144. Krouse, supra note 139.
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and others at the Cleveland Plain Dealer145 never explain that the sale of
LTV Steel's assets to LTV Sales Finance meant that these assets were to
be stripped from the company that actually employs workers at the plant.
The concept of debt finance as judgment-proofing schema - as a way to
shelter assets from claims by LTV Steel's workers or other unsecured
creditors is completely absent.
Finance industry experts, of course, wrote and read plenty on LTV
Steel. Reports on LTV's financings appear in publications circulated
among finance experts such as Asset Securitization Report, Investment
Dealers Digest, CFO Magazine, Bankruptcy Strategist and others.
146
These publications are specifically written and published for those who
participate in and already understand structured finance. They do not
expand the public discourse on structured finance to the greater public.
The scope and perspective in the reporting on LTV's bouts with
bankruptcy typify reporting on financing and bankruptcy of large com-
panies. For example, The Miami Herald offers similar fare in its cover-
age of Winn-Dixie. 147 On September 1, 2004, The Miami Herald ran a
story entitled "Winn-Dixie shares plunge amid talk of bankruptcy. 148
The story reports that shareholders have been selling their interests in
Winn-Dixie and that the company is making plans to avert bankruptcy.
149
About three-fourths of the way through, we learn that "in late June, lend-
ers agreed to give the company a $600 million loan. The three-year deal
includes a $400 million revolving credit line and a $200 million letter of
credit.' 50 The fact that this loan is secured by the assets of the company
is not mentioned. Of course, since the security interest itself goes
unmentioned, there is no reference to the possible effects of Winn-
Dixie's credit facility on the company's unsecured creditors and equity
holders. The loan appears as a glimmer of hope that the company might
survive, that is has bought some time in which to turn itself around so
that it may yet be a good investment. We learn that "'steps are being
145. The Plain Dealer ran a number of stories on LTV Steel (which had a large steel plant in
Cleveland). See, e.g., supra note 139.
146. These publications devoted ample energy to assessing the health and future of the securi-
tization industry after In re LTV Steel. See, e.g., Kevin Donovan, Is There Safety in Structure When
Structures Can Change?, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Mar. 15, 2004 (discussing uncertainty sur-
rounding securitization and citing the bankruptcy of LTV Steel); Michael Gregory, Lessons of Risk
in AAA-Rated ABS, In the Rare Bankruptcy, it's Servicers, Not Collateral, That are the Problem,
INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Mar. 15, 2004 (discussing the role of servicers when a company that
has securitized assets entered bankruptcy and citing LTV Steel); Barbara M. Goldstein, Decision of
Note; How Secure Are Your Securitizations? LTV Case Raises Important Issues for Creditors,
BANKR. STRATEGIST, Apr. 2001, at 1 (discussing asset securitization and the impact ofIn re LTV
Steel, Inc.).
147. Josh Fineman, Winn-Dixie Shares Plunge Amid Talk of Bankruptcy, MIAMI HERALD,
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taken to shrink the company and strengthen remaining operations.'
' ' 51
The nature of these steps is not relevant - only that the steps exist, indi-
cating that Winn-Dixie shares may be a good buy at their reduced price.
Imagine the alternative headline: "Winn-Dixie Assigns Away As-
sets as It Staves Off Bankruptcy." Such a story could report that Winn-
Dixie's recent financing assigns all assets to its lenders and out of reach
of its non-adjusting creditors should the company ultimately fail. Jour-
nalists could report whenever businesses with significant numbers of
non-adjusting creditors enter into secured credit facilities. Such stories
might read: "Manufacturing Co. Assigns All Assets to Bank, Taking
Loan to Fund Activities. 152 These stories would treat as news the event
of a businesses' assignment of all of its assets to secure a loan.
Even reporting on Enron's financings failed to broadcast the basic
ethical issues described in Part IA above surrounding asset securitiza-
tions. 153 Enron was criticized for abusing securitization; its methods of
accounting for securitizations were examined. But statements criticizing
securitization itself were few and far between. 154 Rather, securitization
industry participants were quick to distinguish the practice of securitiza-
tion generally - which they present as common and efficient - and En-
ron's failures to accurately account for assets it transferred to special
purpose entities. Lobbying organizations like the American Securitiza-
tion Forum arose after Enron to protect the industry from onerous regula-
tion.
In a story that is exemplary of its Enron coverage 155 The New York
Times reported the following:
151. Id.
152. Such a story might also alert readers to possible deficiencies in Manufacturing Co.'s
liability insurance coverage.
153. Asset securitization has received widespread attention when it occurs in a public finance
context - primarily, as states securitize tobacco settlement payments. In this context, critics are
quick to point out that the state is taking and spending cash upfront to fix short term budget crises,
relinquishing its rights to future revenue. See e.g., Dennis Chaptman, Tobacco Money is a Quick
Fix; State 's Planning Called Weak, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 5, 2002, at B 1; American Lung
Association of California, In the Spotlight: Securitizing Tobacco Settlement Funds, Questions and
Answers, www.califomialung.org/spotlight/securitizing000710.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2001).
The policy considerations surrounding this type of securitization differ significantly from those
surrounding a business asset securitization. For example, the state may not want to depend on future
revenue that is tied to particular industry performance. Despite differences, the fact that securitiza-
tion is openly criticized in a public finance context makes the lack of serious criticism in a business
finance context even more perplexing.
154. Reporting on Enron's failure and suspect accounting practices did offer a few statements
that speak to ethical concerns of securitization generally. These stories, however, are a small minor-
ity and have largely disappeared since reporting on the scandal has diminished. See e.g., Janet Kidd
Stewart, Flashing Yellow on Asset-Backed Debt, CHI. TRIB., June 16, 2002, at C1; Mary Vanac, Now
Investors are Wondering Whether They Can Trust the Numbers ofAny Company That Uses Off-the-
Balance-Sheet Arrangements; Enron Shows Your Ignorance Can Hurt You, CLE. PLAIN DEALER,
Apr. 3, 2002, at C1.
155. E.g., cf Riva D. Atlas, Enron 's Many Strands: The Law Firm; A Law Firm's 2 Roles Risk
Suit by Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at C I; Floyd Norris & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many
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'Enron gives a very useful tool a bad name for no reason,' said
Ronald Gilson, a law professor at both Stanford and Columbia.
'Structured finance is used for a zillion different and worthwhile pur-
poses. The problem is Enron used it to create a structure that was
genuinely not transparent, to hide things.' 156
The story continues:
[Gilson's] concern was echoed by David M. Eisenberg, a partner at
the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett and a pioneer in securitiza-
tion, the process of creating asset-backed securities. 'Any financing
techniques can be abused,' Mr. Eisenberg said. 'Securitization is not
special in that. But true securitization is about transferring risk to
others - and Enron only appeared to be doing that, when in reality
they were retaining the risk themselves.' 157
This story offers no statements to counter these characterizations of secu-
ritization. The problem with Enron was that it just did not get its asset
securitizations right.
Given the volume of information provided by CNNMoney, Market-
place, NPR, The New York Times and other similar sources, the uniform-
ity of vantage point in the business and finance stories of these sources
raises questions. Obviously The New York Times, CNN and NPR are
well aware of wealth disparities. In addition, as major providers of jour-
nalistic reporting, people within these organizations are aware of the
concept of objectivity, of distance from a subject, essential to decent
reporting. Why are wealth disparities and critical distance from one's
subject suddenly ignored when the subject is business finance?
Business writing reports on business successes and failures for an
audience of self-interested players or pawns in a game the objectives of
which are beyond questioning. Wasik states that with few exceptions
"business writers base their work on . . .the idea that, as the ultimate
authors of business, . . . Americans need not be lectured about its plots,
themes, and subtexts. ' ' 58 Contemporary business "journalism" suggests
that Americans view finance as the province of experts and large finan-
Strands: The Accounting; Fuzzy Rules of Accounting and Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Cl;
Kurt Eichenwald, After Enron, Bankers Weigh Clients' Motives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at Cl.
156. Diana B. Henriques, The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2002,
§ 3, at31.
157. Id.
158. Wasik, supra note 111. Wasik writes that business reporting has not always been so
monolithic. He contrasts contemporary writing on business to writing in Fortune magazine in the
1930s: "Reading the Depression-era Fortune at seventy years' remove, one is struck not by the
magazine's purported progressivism ... but instead by its critical distance. Although aimed at the
businessman, Fortune never pretended to serve his immediate self-interest. It held industry apart as
an object of analysis." Wasik, supra note 111. Wasik attributes the change in practices of reporting
on business to "democratization" of stock ownership. Id. An analysis of whether contemporary
discourse on finance differs from that of the past, and the causes of such difference, are beyond the
scope of this article.
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cial institutions as our keepers, our sources of capital and livelihood.
What is scandalous about Enron, or insider trading, is that individuals
have taken advantage of the corporate form and engaged in dishonesty
for illicit personal gain. The idea of the corporation itself as paternal, as
having interests that are aligned with public interests, remains extremely
salient.
The absence of critical distance in widely circulated writing about
business evidences the hegemony of the idea that business growth is
Americans' best and even our only source of economic and social stabil-
ity. 159 This hegemony obviates the space in which we might find in ref-
erence to Article 9 the irony or emotional response that socially conten-
tious topics command. Without critical distance, conversations about
secured financing will continue to seem boring, neutral, technical and
irrelevant to those not invited into the board room or the drafting session
despite secured financing's broad social implications.
B. Unsecured Creditors and an Imagined Community of Individual
Investors, Large and Small
The lack of critical distance in reporting on business and finance is
a form of collective disregard of severe socio-economic inequalities
among Americans. This article proposes that this disregard enables se-
cured creditors to present full priority secured credit as a system that
furthers the public's best interest. Where does this collective disregard
come from and how does it persist?
Building on the work of Benedict Anderson 160 and others, this arti-
cle hypothesizes that contemporary reporting on business and finance
indicates an imagined community of capitalists or investors. This com-
munity of investors is imagined because its members assume commonal-
ities with one another despite the fact that they may never meet or even
have any contact with one another. It is a community (as discussed in
greater detail below) because those who do and those who aspire to par-
ticipate in capitalism as investors share a unified field of exchange that
generates comradeship despite vast differences and inequalities among
members. The myth of this community is that everyone belongs. Media
on business and finance further the myth of opportunity - of an open
playing field - for financial gain. This myth fuels the imaginings that
encourage even those who struggle financially to identify as members.
Contemporary reporting on business and finance shows an uncriti-
cal deference to businesses' objectives, to finance experts and the capi-
159. Again, hegemony means a system or set of ideas that is so dominant that people living
within the system of ideas have internalized its premises and values to the point where those values
become invisible. See supra text accompanying note 17.
160. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (2nd ed. 1983).
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talist values they express.' 6 1  How might we infer the existence of an
imagined community from this reporting? What are this community's
salient features? Further, how does the concept of an imagined commu-
nity of investors affect legal scholars' responses to Article 9 and the
UCC drafting process? The remainder of this article pursues these ques-
tions.
Benedict Anderson's book, Imagined Communities162 has widely in-
fluenced scholars in many fields, including many legal scholars. 163 This
article relates Anderson's concept of imagined community and the lack
of critical distance in public discourse on finance to critique legal schol-
ars' responses to the expansion of full priority secured credit.
Anderson develops his concept of imagined communities in a study
of the rise of the nation-state. 164 This article extracts the concept of
imagined communities from Anderson's work in order to name and to
capture the sense of collective identification with the needs of capital that
enables secured creditors' control over laws governing secured transac-
tions.
Though this article is by no means a thorough reading or application
of Anderson's thesis, it can be read to imply a relationship between an
imagined community of capitalists and the identity of the United States
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See ANDERSON, supra note 160. Anderson's idea of the nation as imagined community
has widely influenced the study of nationalism in the twenty years since its publication. Though the
study of nationalism has evolved significantly since 1983, the idea of imagined community as a basis
for national consciousness remains central to many scholars' understandings of the subject. Scholars
of nationalism describe Anderson's book as "unavoidable in recent discussions of nationalism."
Ross POOLE, NATION AND IDENTITY 10 (1999); see generally E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM SINCE 1780: PROGRAMME, MYTH, REALITY (1990); BECOMING NATIONAL: A
READER (Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny eds., 1996). This article does not address nationalism
or the idea of nation as imagined community. Rather, it uses Anderson's concept of imagined com-
munities to propose the existence of an imagined community of investors or capitalists the existence
of which limits unsecured creditors' possibilities for response to Article 9.
163. Many legal scholars writing in a wide range of areas draw on Anderson's concept of
imagined communities. There are so many references to Anderson and "imagined communities"
within legal scholarship that a thorough inventory of them is not possible here. Following are a few
examples of some recent, and some common, uses of Anderson by legal academies: Rachel F.
Moran applies Anderson's ideas to discuss of the evolution of law and history. See Rachel F.
Moran, Critical Race Studies: Race Representation, and Remembering, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1513,
1515-20 (2002). Imagined communities are created in part through a telling of the community's
history. Id. This telling of history in the process of creating an imagined community involves sup-
pression or erasure of counter-history. Id. at 1528. Hence, in Moran's words, "slavery and its leg-
acy represent one of the most direct challenges to America's imagined community, bound by ties of
fraternity and equality." Id. Anderson's work has influenced numerous other scholars in the area of
critical race theory as well. These writers cite Anderson - or simply reference the concept of imag-
ined communities - to show how certain groups imagine themselves to have a particular racial,
national, or other social identity. Martha Minow cites Anderson in her discussion of the social
construction of identity. See Martha Minow, Speech: Not Only for Myself Identity, Politics, and
Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647, 662-63 (1996). Paul Schiff Berman draws heavily on Anderson's presen-
tation of nation-states as imagined communities in his critique of jurisdiction. See Paul Schiff Ber-
man, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 462-65 (2002).
164. ANDERSON, supra note 160, at 4-7.
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as a nation-state. 165  Robert E. Scott has stated that "Article 9 simply
cannot be rationalized as a panglossian experiment in nation-building."'
' 66
Scott is right if nation-building means institutionalizing a preference for
national over local creditors in the market for secured loans. However,
this article might be read to hypothesize that Article 9 has a relationship
to nation-building in the United States separate from whether it facilitates
local or national markets in the sense that it institutionalizes collective
deference to the demands and viewpoints of finance experts and financial
institutions.
The purpose here is to introduce the idea of an imagined community
of investors that: (i) undermines non-adjusting creditors' capacity for
organized political participation, 67 and (ii) provides an explanation for
secured creditors' control over Article 9 that commercial law scholars
have heretofore overlooked. This purpose is fulfilled regardless of
whether the imagined community of investors could ever be related suc-
cessfully to United States nationalism.
The critical reading of contemporary media on business in Part II.A
suggests that the persistence of full priority can be viewed as the product
of a docile acquiescence with which the public responds to finance in-
dustry rules and statements. 68 This docile acquiescence is not a function
165. The analysis in this article could perhaps be expanded to argue that belonging to an imag-
ined community of capitalists is a crucial component of national identity in the United States. Par-
ticipating in common capitalist endeavors could be viewed as a way in which citizens of the United
States identify one another as sharing nationality. See LIAH GREENFELD,THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM:
NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 363-472 (2001) (tracing the history of capitalist values in
the formation of United States nationalism and describing a "spirit of capitalism" that has permeated
the formation and development of America). Though every such participation may not represent an
instance of national consciousness, one could present the phenomenon of collective participation in
capitalism and deference to finance experts in the United States as one facet of national identity. An
analysis sufficient to sustain these claims about American nationalism could go on to argue that this
facet of national identity has gone unexplored in legal scholars' critiques of how Article 9 expands
the scope of secured credit despite serious and legitimate concerns for fairness and just distributions
of wealth. This deference can be viewed as a crucial component of national identity. This article
leaves such an assessment of United States national identity and Article 9 to another project.
166. Robert E. Scott, The Mythology ofArticle 9, 79 MINN. L. REV. 853, 856 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Mythology].
167. The imagined community hypothesis presented here suggests an affirmative identification
with or desire to belong to a class of people that invests on some level. This identification aggravates
and precedes problems of collective action. Collective action problems arise from the fact that
rational and self-interested behavior in individuals does not lead to self-interested behavior at the
collective or group level. Theorists of collective action have shown that in a large group, in order for
collective interest to give rise to collective action, there must be compulsion or individual incentive
to act in the group's interest. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Disadvantaged unsecured creditors, however,
do not even recognize themselves as a class or as having collective interests vis-A-vis the laws gov-
erning secured finance that they could articulate and then pursue either out of individual interest or
through compulsion. The constant urging by the media to identify with an imagined community of
investors discourages the possibility of alternative collective identification. Failure to identify col-
lective interest undermines capacity for action. Whether, and under what conditions, collective
identification would in fact yield collective action is a separate problem.
168. For a discussion of instances of dissent that disrupt this docile acquiescence, see infra, text
accompanying notes 183-84.
CREDITORS' IMAGINED COMMUNITIES
of inability to comprehend sophisticated financial concepts. Rather, it
can be attributed to a widespread identification among unsecured credi-
tors of belonging to an imagined community of capitalists. To imagine
oneself as belonging to a community one must be willing, on some level,
to disregard or suppress inequalities between oneself and one's fellow
members of the community. 69 Critics of UCC Article 9 have not con-
sidered the possibility of such an imagined community, or the myths that
perpetuate it, in assessing how and why full priority secured credit per-
sists.
Anderson writes about the capacity of strangers to imagine them-
selves as belonging to one, abstract community. 170 The rise of print capi-
talism, in Anderson's view, fostered this capacity.171 He writes the fol-
lowing about reading newspapers:
The significance of this mass ceremony - Hegel observed that news-
papers serve modem man as a substitute for morning prayers - is
paradoxical. It is performed ... in the lair of the skull. Yet each
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being
replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of
whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the
slightest notion .... At the same time, the newspaper reader, observ-
ing exact replicas of his own newspaper being consumed by his sub-
way... neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world
is visibly rooted in everyday life .... [F]iction seeps quietly and con-
tinuously into reality, creating ... remarkable confidence of commu-
nity in anonymity .... 172
Reporting on business and finance in the United States enjoys an audi-
ence the members of which, by virtue of their shared consumption of this
reporting and the capitalist values it reflects, can imagine commonalities
with one another despite anonymity. If readers are protagonists and there
are many readers, then there are many protagonists - many in the same
position vis-A-vis businesses' activities, vis-A-vis a world of investment
activity. This shared position urges business owners in one region, for
example, to imagine that business owners in another region read the
same Wall Street Journal, care for the profitability of their businesses,
and hope for financial success, just as they do. It urges collective identi-
fication with investment options. An employee in one state can assume
that an employee in a completely different state must consider the same
interest rate trends, think about the same 401K investment options, and
169. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 165, at 365 (finding that "equality is a central value in
all nationalisms"); ANDERSON, supra note 160, at 7 (stating that a community achieves horizontal
comradeship despite actual inequality and exploitation among its members).
170. ANDERSON, supra note 160, at 37-46.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 35-36. Note that the final phrase of this passage in the original text is: "which is the
hallmark of modem nations."
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
hope to take advantage of the latest home mortgage incentives, just as he
or she does. The media's constant appeal to reader-investors, coupled
with the existence of common endeavors for profit, enables business
owners or employees to imagine commonality with one another despite
the fact that they will never meet.
This imagined commonality generates a sense of community.
Readers of business or finance journalism share a unified field of ex-
change in the form of markets, primarily capital markets and real estate
markets. The public discourse surrounding these markets projects the
image of participation as a necessary, common endeavor. The rhetoric of
economics, of game metaphors, of competition - deployed in the voice
of the self-interested player - invite readers to imagine their fellow
"players." Readers can be confident that these players exist even if they
never meet. We imagine a community of investors in the sense that for
every seller we can infer a buyer (and vice versa). Everyone's individual
investments are growing in proportion to everyone else's. Sometimes
members of this community view one another as competitors, such as
when two buyers bid for the same asset. Sometimes they view one an-
other as cohorts, such as when collective excitement about a certain stock
raises its value. Regardless of perpetual shifting of interests within the
community, the mode of reporting described in Part II.A constantly rein-
forces the existence of fellow community members and their basic com-
mitment to capitalist values.
Anderson writes that the imagined community that comprises a na-
tion can be described as a community because it is based on a sense of
comradeship that persists regardless of inequality and exploitation within
its borders. 173 This article views lack of critical distance in business so-
called journalism as disregard for or denial of inequality. This virtually
uncontested denial suggests existence of an imagined community of in-
vestors or capitalists that maintains a sense of horizontal comradeship, of
common endeavor, despite intense inequality and exploitation within the
group.
One major difference between this community and Anderson's
imagined communities is that the limits of this community are not explic-
itly delineated by reference to an "other". Anderson's imagined commu-
nities are limited "because even the largest of them, encompassing per-
haps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, be-
yond which lie other nations. ' 174 Again, Anderson's focus is on the na-tion-state as imagined community. 175
173. Id. at7.
174. Id. at7.
175. See generally id.
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Many definitions of community focus on constructions of otherness
and exclusion to evidence affiliation among members. But clear indicia
of unity and exclusion are not endemic to the idea of community. 76 For
example, Jerry Frug does "not cede the term community to those who
evoke the romance of togetherness."1 77 Frug presents community as "the
being together of strangers"; community is not limited to "feelings of
identity or unity. ' 78 Yet, to speak of a community, one must identify
some commonality or sharing of space that makes the concept of com-
munity relevant. The communities Frug describes and proposes, for ex-
ample, are rooted in geographic commonality.
179
Who is the "us" for whom popular writing on business and finance
is produced? The community of investors shares no specific territory.
Rather, the community of investors congregates in the virtual space of
the marketplace. Scholars have researched and written about communi-
ties that transcend traditional boundaries.1 80 As one such scholar, Jessica
Berman, writes: "We move in a realm of being-in-common that rests
upon the border between 'I' and 'we,' a border that may not necessarily
coincide with the political boundaries that surround us' 8 1 when we
speak of community.
The "us" of the imagined community of capitalists is expansive in
that it extends beyond physical borders to various marketplaces -for
home mortgages, for retirement plans, for stocks, for leases. These mar-
kets themselves are limited by the laws that create and police them, and
the "us" that participates in these markets is restricted as well. This
community presumes and imposes highly specific, particular thought
patterns and behaviors. It is limited in the sense that, though the range of
members is broad and wide, the members can picture a proverbial "bot-
tom rung of the social ladder" to which the community does not extend.
The excluded are rarely held up and spoken about as an "other" against
which the "us" of the community must be defined. Rather, the presence
of, and the fear for many of falling into or remaining forever within, that
"other" is conspicuously absent. This conspicuous absence functions as
a threat of exclusion for those who do not participate in the community
or who reject the community's values.
176. Ample scholarship in anthropology and other fields addresses the question of what is a
community, but comes to very little consensus. See, e.g., George A. Hillery, Jr., Definitions of
Community: Areas ofAgreement, 20 RURAL SOC. 111 (1955) (compiling ninety-four attempts within
the social sciences to define community and finding that the only significant overlap among them
was that all of the definitions deal with human beings); NIGEL RAPPORT & JOANNA OVERING,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 60-65 (2001) (discussing various theorists approaches to
community).
177. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1047, 1049 (1996).
178. Id. at 1048-49.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., JESSICA BERMAN, MODERNIST FICTION, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND THE POLITICS
OF COMMUNITY 1-27 (2001); Special Issue, Globalization, 12 PUB. CULTURE 1-289 (2000).
181. BERMAN, supra note 180, at 3-4.
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This article proposes that employees and other non-adjusting credi-
tors identify with the imagined community of investors. 182 This use of
the concept of imagined community relates obstacles to informing non-
adjusting creditors to a lack of class consciousness in the United
States. 83 This article does not intend to imply that class consciousness is
completely non-existent in the United States. Rather, this article situates
the relative obscurity of laws governing debt finance within a more gen-
eral apathy towards challenging the legal mechanisms with which busi-
ness raise capital. This apathy can be described as a lack of class con-
sciousness, given the distributive effects of the laws in question. Identi-
fication with or a sense of belonging to an imagined community of inves-
tors is one way to explain this apathy.
Instances of dissent that disrupt identification with this imagined
community, like labor or environmental movement responses to capital-
ist behavior, are products of specific types of direct violence. Also, labor
and environmental movement advocates remain voices from the outside
vis-A-vis business finance. The indirect violence of a secured loan - that
a company continues or even augments exploitative practices in order to
service debt agreements - escapes notice. (Default can mean loss of
control, of assets, of viability).
Widespread identification with an imagined community of investors
is not just a simple matter of ignorance of the effects of financing prac-
tices like secured credit that can be attributed to a lack of reporting on
business finance. Identification with an imagined community of inves-
tors stems in part from the knowledge - reinforced in public discourse -
that social safety nets are thin and becoming thinner in the United States.
Americans need to be able to identify with the activities of capitalism
and investment, even if they personally can only hope to invest on a
small scale. The alternative - again, conspicuously absent from the dis-
course - is to weather the threat of a life of severe constriction, poor
182. Organized labor has traditionally been one of the few, powerful voices against unchecked
capitalism in the United States. However, this historical role does not prevent workers from identi-
fying as members of the imagined community of capitalists. Far from feeling a sense of opposition
to an investor class, a great many workers identify as investors themselves. See, e.g., Stephen F.
Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assess-
ment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351 (2002). Many workers organize employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs) to own their employers and to bid for companies or company divisions. Investment bank-
ing firms encourage unions - whose pension funds are major investors in leveraged buyout pools -
to consider bidding.
183. Phenomena of identification among middle and working class individuals in the United
States with institutions and political programs that are exploitative have been described by a wide
range of writers. For example, with respect to labor, see ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, RACE REBELS:
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND THE BLACK WORKING CLASS 32 (1994) (discussing how white working-
class racism has undermined black labor struggles and undercut the potential for working class
solidarity); Befort, infra note 182, at 375 (referencing the American labor movement's embrace of
capitalist objectives); Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor




health, and poverty in old age. This threat has been taken on. But it has
only been taken on to avoid the violence of substandard labor conditions
and of cruel diseases associated with environmental pollution and de-
struction. Because violence associated with secured credit ensues indi-
rectly, it seems that fidelity to the values of an imagined community of
investors will preclude any targeted uprising of disadvantaged creditors
against absolute priority credit.
Very few individuals in the United States succeed in exempting
themselves from the imagined community of investors. Many may ig-
nore the type of reporting and information described in Part II.A, but few
can claim independence from the financial activities, both personal and
institutional, on which that reporting focuses. If social security were
ever "privatized" the general public would feel that identification with
the imagined community of investors even more intensely.' 84 Wide-
spread media makes this identification seem necessary to achieve a sense
of personal security, especially in old age and in light of difficulties in
accessing decent health care.
This reading that an imagined community both produces and is cre-
ated by the monolithic investors' vantage point in popular media on
business and finance may feel like a throwback to the "myth and sym-
bol" school of the 1950s. The myth and symbol historians and writers
were among the first American scholars to analyze the intellectual con-
tent of popular culture. 85 They showed the power of myth and symbols
to affect public policy and social values even when the myth or symbols
themselves were irrational or lacked any relation to actuality. 86 Later,
this mode of scholarship was highly criticized for presenting an "Ameri-
can world view" that is monolithic - that excluded heterogeneous, mi-
nority and other viewpoints.' 87 More recent trends have focused on re-
jecting the construction of dominant myths or on how dissident groups
reject the myth. 188 However, in contemporary times (e.g., during George
W. Bush's campaigns and presidency) symbolic language and myth-
making in public discourse has gained prominence. Contemporary
scholars have recognized the need to revisit understandings of the crea-
tion and role of dominant myths in policy making.' 89
184. See generally The Diane Rehm Show: Social Security and Market Risk (NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO broadcast Feb. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.wamu.org/prorams/dr/O5/02/23.php (discussing the effects and desirability of Bush's
proposed social security reforms).
185. See, e.g., HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND
MYTH (1950); C. Wyatt Evans, An Analysis of 'Myth and Symbol', THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,
Feb. 11, 2005, at B4.
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This article's presentation of an imagined community of capitalists
- the projected readers of widespread media on business and finance -
does not intend to suggest homogeneity within the community. Rather, it
presents a dominant myth projected by media - that Americans are in-
vestors or capitalists who encounter business and finance as self-
interested players, large or small - and then speculates on the audience
for and effects of this dominant myth.
UCC scholars write that Article 9's full priority schema was re-
cently expanded without opposition in part because unsecured creditors'
interests are too diffuse to oppose the relatively coherent interests of se-
cured creditors. 90 The story goes that this diffusion, plus the technical
difficulty of the code, makes effective popular opposition to Article 9
impossible. This work builds on this reading of the capacities of unse-
cured creditors by considering why these creditors' interests seem so
diffuse. The existence of an imagined community of investors, plus the
myth that everyone belongs to such a community, would lead non-
adjusting creditors to accept without pause secured creditors' standard
refrains, such as: (i) giving companies maximum ability to raise capital is
in the community's common interest, and (ii) any limitation on full prior-
ity will restrict access to capital.
III. READING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN LIGHT OF CREDITORS' IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES
This Part demonstrates how the idea of an imagined community of
capitalists with which non-adjusting creditors identify affects arguments
about full priority secured credit. It critiques the work of prominent
commercial law scholars Robert E. Scott, Warren, Lynn LoPucki and
others. Scott writes about the UCC drafting process and certain struc-
tural peculiarities of Article 9, while Warren and LoPucki propose revi-
sions to Article 9 to counter its distributive effects. This article builds
upon the works of Scott, Warren and LoPucki by situating them within
the socio-political context described in parts I and II.
A. Robert E. Scott's Analysis of the UCC Drafting Process
In The Politics of Article 9, Robert E. Scott rejects the "standard
scholarly practice" of treating "the UCC and similar laws as if they were
created by rule-generating 'black boxes." ' 191 Because of this scholarly
practice, Scott contends, scholars have failed to debate whether internal
workings of institutions that produce laws like the UCC are desirable.
192
Scott seeks to begin such a debate by "examining the Article 9 law mak-
190. See supra notes 6-7. For example, there is an organization - The National Association of
Credit Management - that represents trade creditors and has about 50,000 members. This associa-
tion did not insert itself into the Article 9 debate leading up to the 1999 revisions.




ing process in much the same way that political scientists study legisla-
tures."
'1 93
Scott focuses on how special interest groups can dominate uniform
commercial law revision because uniform laws are drafted by what he
calls "private legislatures."'194 The ALI and NCCUSL function as a "pri-
vate" lawmaking or policy setting team. 95 We can regard the ALI and
NCCUSL as a "legislature" since states largely adopt pro forma laws like
Article 9 that the ALl and NCCUSL propose.196 Yet, despite their law-
making function, according to Scott, the ALL and NCCUSL "believe that
their function is to deal with technical problems that can be resolved by
legal expertise and to avoid issues whose resolution requires controver-
sial value choices."' 97  State representatives apparently regard this "leg-
islature's" task in drafting revised Article 9 as non-political. How can
the drafting of a statute with profound consequences for wealth distribu-
tion and liability stand as a non-political process?
A "private legislature" - like the UCC drafting committee - has no
constituency or independent power base to which it answers.' 98 There-
fore, it needs interest group support (or lack of opposition) to have its
proposed laws enacted.' 99 Also, Scott writes:
Ordinary legislatures have mechanisms for finding facts [hearings]
that are unavailable to [private legislative groups], and are exposed to
many more sources of information concerning the effects of the pro-
posals that they consider. Truth is a likely corrective to outputs that
are skewed by the process itself.
200
Scott does not draw a firm conclusion as to whether the Article 9
drafting process is in fact dominated by interest group influence, but he
suggests that evidence weighs in favor of such a conclusion. 20  Scott's
work co-authored with Alan Schwartz predicts that a private legislature
such as ALl and NCCUSL would adopt bright-line rules and not flexible
193. Id.
194. Scott's private legislature analysis of the UCC drafting process first appeared in an article
that he co-authored with Alan Schwartz. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Econ-
omy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 595 (1995). Schwartz also studied the ALl and
NCCUSL predicting that "a private legislature (a "PL") would: (a) have a status quo bias, rejecting
serious reforms; (b) adopt rules (as opposed to standards) when lobbied by a single interest group;
and (c) adopt standards, or succumb to paralysis, when lobbied by competing groups." Alan
Schwartz, The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures, 62 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (2002)
(responding to Robert Rasmussen's arguments on the competence and desirability of private legisla-
tures).
195. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 194, at 596.
196. See id.
197. Scott, Politics, supra note 3, at 1805-06.
198. Id at 1813.
199. Id. at 1813-14.
200. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 194, at 651.
201. See Scott Politics, supra note 3, at 1816.
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202standards when lobbied by a single interest group. Revised Article 9consists primarily of bright-line rules.
Scott asserts that the efficiency of the ALINCCUSL private legisla-
ture depends in large part on whether the interests of the dominant group
in the drafting process are aligned with public interest. 203 Scott does not
opine as to whether this is the case for Article 9.204 However, throughout
his argument we see that the relation between interest group interests and
the private legislature participants' conception of public interest is cen-
tral to assessment of the nature and quality of the Article 9 drafting proc-
ess.20 5 This article builds on Scott's theory by proposing that the lack of
critical distance on finance and the existence of an imagined community
of investors encourage lawmakers to perceive creditors' interests as con-
sonant with public interest.
If the Article 9 drafting process is controlled by a coherent interest
group, then, Scott suggests, this interest group is permitted to control in
large part because of a perceived consonance of industry objectives and
public good.206 Scott repeatedly references the issue of whether the pub-
lic's interest is aligned with the interests of the dominant group in the
Article 9 revisions process.20 7 Interest group influence on the Article 9
revisions process is benign, Scott states, as long as interests of the group
sufficiently align with the public interest.208 Scott never articulates a
position or offers any evidence as to whether such an alignment of inter-
ests actually exists.20 9
This article argues that the interest groups that participate in the Ar-
ticle 9 drafting process do benefit from a societal view that increasing
businesses' access to credit is in the public interest. The analysis in Part
II articulates and makes controversial the social reality that implicitly
drives Scott's argument. The current state of public discourse on finance
and the existence of an imagined community of investors with which
unsecured investors identify, make secured creditors' influence on the
UCC drafting process appear benign.
Scott writes:
[An] underlying intellectual premise of the ALI and NCCUSL [is that
i]f Article 9 rules can be derived from uncontroversial moral prem-
ises and constructed with traditional legal skills, then small groups of
202. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 194, at 597.
203. Scott, Politics, supra note 3, at 1850.
204. See generally id. (discussing ALI/NCCUSL efficiency in general without applying the
analysis specifically to Article 9).
205. See generally id (describing the private legislature Article 9 drafting process).
206. Id. at 1818.
207. Id. at 1790.
208. Id.




'experts' can create ... reforms, and larger groups of less informed
practitioners and judges ... can choose the best ones.
2 10
The study group convened by the ALI to propose revisions to Article 9
was comprised of experts whose technical expertise authorized them to
propose rules to govern security interests in personal property. The ex-
perts' proposals were offered to the remainder of the private legislature
participants for review. Scott states that the messages of an expert "will
be taken as credible when ... not inconsistent with the uninformed pref-
erences of the median PL [private legislature] members. ' 211 "People of
good judgment," Scott writes, "tend to heed . . . expert advice, espe-
cially when they are unable to inform themselves independently.,
212
But Scott does not ask: What constitutes these "uninformed prefer-
ences" of the private legislature participants? Why are they "unable to
inform themselves independently?" The lack of critical distance in me-
dia on business and finance is perhaps one very important factor driving
these uninformed preferences. From the vantage point of an imagined
community of investors to which everyone belongs, secured creditors'
views can appear fully consonant with public interest. The limited range
of viewpoints in public discourse on business and finance, and the myth
of belonging to an imagined community of investors that this discourse
generates, converge to facilitate secured creditors' influence on the law
and limit the range of unsecured creditors' responses.
B. Information Asymmetry as a Hindrance to Reform
Scott repeatedly implies that secured creditors' control over Article
9 would erode if the public were more aware of and engaged by the sub-
ject of commercial secured finance.213 The interests of unsecured credi-
tors, he writes, are just not sufficiently cohesive to oppose secured credi-
214tors. Scott states that unsecured creditors must bear the costs of be-
coming informed and organizing to oppose the effects of Article 9.215
These costs are high, according to Scott, because of the heterogeneity of
interests among unsecured creditors and the infrequency of involvement
in transactions involving secured credit.216
210. Id. at 1808. The Article 9 study group was comprised of two academic reporters and
sixteen members - three legal academics and thirteen practicing lawyers. On particularly technically
complex issues, the reporters and chair sought recommendations from advisory groups of "experts."
Id. at 1907-08. Given the UCC drafters' conception of their task, Scott continues, "The principal
currency in the [Article 9] Study Group is technical expertise . and the greatest asset is knowl-
edge of how the rules 'really work' in practice." Id. at 1808.
211. Id. at 1815.
212. Id.
213. See id at 1850.
214. Id. at 1806.
215. See id. at 1848-49.
216. Id. at 1807.
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Scott is far from alone in this conclusion. A range of scholars cite
as an obstacle to reform the apparent inability of unsecured creditors to
inform themselves sufficiently to oppose Article 9's favoring of secured
creditors. For example, Edward J. Janger, like Scott, writes that unse-
cured and non-consenting creditors are too diffuse to mount any opposi-
tion to secured creditors. 217 Warren also echoes the sentiment that unse-
cured creditors have not been able to articulate their positions in the de-
bate over full priority.218 In addition, Warren suggests that many law-
yers concerned with social justice are not adequately engaged and in-
formed when it comes to commercial law issues.219
It is true that costs to unsecured creditors of becoming sufficiently
informed to oppose the distributional consequences of Article 9 are high.
However, these scholars have not thoroughly, critically addressed why
they are high. The interests of all unsecured creditors, viewed as a single
class, may be highly diverse. But there are many large groups of unse-
cured creditors - such as employees - whose interest in having recourse
against a debtor that assigned all of its assets to a secured creditor are
fairly coherent. Also, employees cannot be said to deal infrequently with
secured transactions when their financial security may be affected by one
or a few secured transactions that encumber the assets of their employer
for the duration of their working life. Likewise, trial lawyers represent-
ing tort claimants are a relatively coherent group with an interest in their
clients' ability to recover awards. They may deal repeatedly with defen-
dants who do not pay awards because the defendant's liability insurance
is inadequate and a secured creditor recovers all of the value of a defen-
dant as collateral before the company pays a tort judgment.
20
The high cost to unsecured creditors of becoming sufficiently in-
formed to oppose Article 9 is not due to the UCC's technical difficulty or
complexity. Rather, it is due to a privileged position that contemporary
writing on finance and business gives to the statements of finance insid-
ers. It is due to the monolithic quality of the information on business and
finance made widely available. The information asymmetry between
secured creditors and non-adjusting creditors is entrenched by the lack of
217. See Janger, supra note 2, at 587. Janger's take on how secured creditors maintain control
over the substance of Article 9 focuses on concerns for uniformity in the enactment of Article 9 in
state legislatures and state legislatures' ability to externalize the costs of full priority secured credit.
State legislatures, he argues, have incentive to enact the full priority version of Article 9 because to
do otherwise might increase costs of capital in the state, causing businesses to incorporate or do
business elsewhere. The costs of secured credit do not necessarily affect the state in which a busi-
ness is located. A business may be registered or have headquarters in one jurisdiction, but have
employees, hold assets and conduct risky activities in another jurisdiction. See id. at 581.
218. See Warren, supra note 6, at 1394-95.
219. See generally Elizabeth Warren, What is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial
Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 19 (2002) (arguing that students
and lawyers concerned with social justice must learn to understand and consider commercial and
bankruptcy law in order to be effective).
220. See LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,4 (1996) (explaining how parties to
secured transactions use such transactions to avoid liability).
[Vol. 83:2
CREDITORS' IMAGINED COMMUNITIES
critical voices in discourse on finance that might otherwise provide
needed information to non-adjusting creditors.22' The monolithic van-
tage point of widespread public discourse on finance encourages non-
adjusting creditors to identify with belonging to an imagined community
of investors irrespective of their personal financial situations.
C. The Threat of Credit Constriction as a Hindrance to Reform
The most obvious and powerful response that secured creditors
make when faced with the prospect of partial priority is that that they
will extend less credit under a partial priority system.222 Participants in
the Article 9 revisions process echo the secured creditors' position.223
Steven Harris and Charles Mooney, the reporters for the Article 9 draft-
ing committee, for example, cite purported diminution in financing in
their defense of full priority.224 Warren describes how assertion of credit
225constriction is treated as a debate stopper. Warren points out that
whether partial priority will reduce credit is untested and unfounded
226
and that debtors in nations with partial priority systems do not appear to
suffer from a dearth of credit.227
Bebchuck and Fried make an efficiency based argument to debunk
the credit constriction claim.22 8 They argue that "on an aggregate basis,
the availability and cost of credit need not change substantially under a
rule of partial priority. 229 In practice, they claim, many current secured
claims do not end up having full priority in bankruptcy, so lenders cannot
claim that they wouldn't lend under a partial priority system.2 30 They go
on to argue, among other things, that projects that would not go forward
under a partial priority system would be projects that externalize costs
onto non-adjusting creditors that are not offset by the overall value the
2311project creates.
But Warren, LoPucki, Bebchuck and Fried seem to discount the
force of secured creditors' threat of credit constriction. Bebchuck and
Fried make a thorough case that this threat is not rational. But rationality
seems to have little to do with how the laws on priority of secured claims
221. Again, on whether better informing unsecured creditors would lead to reform, see supra
note 167 and text accompanying notes 183-84.
222. Harris & Mooney, Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of
Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1349, 1359 (1997).
223. See id. at 1356-64; Jeffrey S. Turner, The Broad Scope ofRevised Article 9 is Justified, 50
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 328, 328-29 (1996).
224. Harris & Mooney, supra note 222, at 1363-64.
225. Warren, supra note 6, at 1386.
226. Id. at 1379.
227. Id. at 1385 n.34.
228. Lucian A. Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
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231. Id. at 1332-35.
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
are structured. The absence of critical distance on finance permits se-
cured creditors to air threats of credit constriction without opposition or
questioning. Members of an imagined community of investors heed fi-
nancial industry warnings. Article 9 reflects a pervasive social reality
that when faced with a threat of diminished credit availability, which
might have consequences like diminished growth or diminished business
opportunity, lawmakers acquiesce in pursuit of collective well-being.
Secured creditors are asserting their interests within a social context in
which finance experts know best and lawmakers perceive any threat -
however unsubstantiated - of constricting access to capital for businesses
as against public interest.
In his argument to establish priority for non-consenting creditors,
LoPucki seems to disregard concerns about increased costs of capital.
He reasons that "[i]n a world where involuntary creditors have priority,
the secured creditor who can anticipate the priority contest can react to it
by declining to extend credit beyond the debtor's ability to pay.
232
LoPucki reinforces precisely the prediction that drives much of the oppo-
sition to partial priority. His writing seems blind to the strength of the
fear of credit constriction against which he is working.
Harris and Mooney go so far as to denounce the moral hazard of
threatening businesses' access to credit. 233 They state, "data may con-
firm that small businesses (and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses)
would disproportionately comprise that group [that would face constric-
tion of credit]. 234 Warren balks that this argument "can be rephrased to
say that banks want full priority to help their minority friends" 235 and that
Harris and Mooney have no more than anecdotal evidence to support
236their contention. But Harris and Mooney do not need empirical evi-
dence to make an assertion that is so squarely rooted in public belief that
restricting businesses' access to capital will result in a parade of social
travesties.
Within a society steeped in capitalist values - irrespective of how
orthodox its capitalist practices - business growth, credit, and increases
in sources of capital are good. If partial priority would potentially reduce
the availability of credit, then it is highly suspect. Secured creditors do
not need empirical or other evidence to support their claims that partial
priority will mean less credit. Their threat is enough.
232. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Politics ofArticle 9: The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L.
REv. 1887, 1909 (1994).
233. Harris & Mooney, supra note 222, at 1371.
234. Id.




D. Warren's and LoPucki's Calls for Reason and Morality in the Face of
Impoverished Discourse on Finance
Warren and LoPucki each make principled demands that either Ar-
ticle 9 must be made more fair or its proponents must offer some well-
reasoned justification for full priority.237 Warren advocates preserving
twenty percent of debtors' assets for unsecured creditors. 238  LoPucki
argues for granting priority to tort claimants. 239 In making their argu-
ments, both Warren and LoPucki decry the lack of principled justifica-
tion for full priority. But their insistence that scholars and UCC drafters
either provide a reasoned defense of Article 9, or reform Article 9 to con-
form to their well-reasoned critiques, disregards the mythology through
which full priority persists.
Writers who defend the current formulation of Article 9 invoke a
sense of inevitability about the continued expansion of secured credit.
Many commentators on Article 9 treat proposals to temper full priority
secured credit as if they would only mangle the parts and make bumpy
the course of an unstoppable train. But, as Warren observes, if secured
creditors are like a locomotive just plowing ahead towards more and
more ways to extend secured credit, what stops them from attempting to
secure loans with servitude or with human organs?
240
Warren describes academic proponents of full priority as sheepish
and equivocal in their defenses of Article 9. She writes:
While the attack on full priority is quite spirited, the defense of full
priority is hedged in qualifications. Commercial lenders and their
lawyers are willing to come out foursquare for full priority for se-
cured creditors, but the academic analysis has been very different in
tone. Most academic supporters carefully note the limited evidence
on which a conclusion can be based, often describing themselves as
agnostic or waiting for the empirical studies before they commit to a
position on full priority.
241
Warren suggests that commercial lenders and lawyers can perhaps be
expected to advocate the priority schema that allocates the most money
to them.242 But academics, she implies, recognize the moral poverty of
that position and therefore skirt around defending it squarely.24 3
LoPucki laments that so little of legal scholarship has focused on
"whether the institution of security is justified [or] good.",244 He argues
237. Id. at 1390; LoPucki, supra note 232, at 1917.
238. See Warren, supra note 6, at 1388 n.44.
239. LoPucki, supra note 232, at 1900-0 1.
240. Warren, supra note 6, at 1386.
241. Id. at 1373.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Lynn LoPucki, supra note 232, at 1890.
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that security misallocates resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a
bargain to which many, if not most, of them have given no meaningful
consent.245 He states that security enables secured creditors to extract a
246subsidy from unsecured creditors. He argues that Article 9 is essen-
tially a judgment-proofing device that debtors should not be able to use
to avoid liability to non-consenting unsecured creditors.247
But given public discourse on business and finance and the myth
that we all belong to an imagined community of investors, reasoned ar-
guments by legal scholars are not likely to define the scope of enforce-
able security interests. Consider the following statement by Jean
Baudrillard: "Capital, which is immoral and unscrupulous, can only
function behind a moral superstructure .... Secured creditors repre-
sent capital in the most literal sense. What conception of social good
might drive the endurance of full-priority secured credit?
Homer Kripke has written that "the legal structure of secured credit
developed to make possible the mass production and the distribution of
goods" and "that these developments have increased human welfare. 249
The public discourse on finance described in Part II.A corroborates
Kripke's view. Part II.B casts the reader-participants in that discourse as
part of an imagined community of investors that comprises the constitu-
encies to which state representatives answer. Warren's and LoPucki's
calls for reason or morality-based opposition to laws that increase access
to capital and facilitate business growth disregard the presence and
power that such an imagined community presents. Warren and LoPucki
appeal directly to non-adjusting creditors and those who would be their
advocates. Their calls go largely unheard because of a failure of wide-
spread identification with those groups.
E. Robert E. Scott's Presentation of Internal Incoherence in Article 9
According to Scott "the mythology of Article 9 asserts that in-
formed creditors use the filing system to signal less informed creditors,
and that this signaling function justifies the unique priority position cer-
tain creditors enjoy. ' 250  Filing is inadequate to address many fairness
concerns because it helps only voluntary creditors, but it is a fairness
mechanism nonetheless.
245. Id. at 1891.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 1905.
248. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Simulacra and Simulations, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED
WRITINGS 166, 173 (Mark Poster ed., 1988).
249. Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA:. L. REv. 929, 931 n.14 (1985).




The aims of the filing system are undermined by other central fea-
tures of Article 9 such as, for example, the protection given the floating
lien and the special priority given to the purchase money security interest
(PMSI).21  On the one hand, Article 9 presents a rule: secured creditors
must file a UCC-1 financing statement to perfect and the first to file will
be first in line to recover.252 But at the same time, exceptions within Ar-
ticle 9 to this rule reveal a policy-driven structure designed to maximize
access to credit regardless of fairness. The best way to describe the pol-
icy furthered by revised Article 9 is as a policy of maximizing secured
credit. Whether Article 9 pursues this maximization to further effi-
ciency, administrative capacity, freedom of contract, etc., in the litany of
classic policy objectives, is unclear in both the drafting sessions and the
scholarly literature on Article 9.253
Scott finds that:
The [1999] revisions reflect a dramatic escalation of the tension be-
tween the twin goals of Article 9: the maintenance of public confi-
dence through the use of a broad-based, facially neutral filing system
and the development of rules that reduce costs for particular classes
of secured creditors.
254
Scott identifies this contradiction as "an institutional and structural prob-
lem, a function of the political economy of the process by which the
UCC is produced and revised.
' 255
Scott accepts as trenchant a contradiction between maintaining the
"mythology of a filing system"256 and at the same time enacting excep-
tions, or other rules, in the name of expanding secured credit. Scott
writes of this tension:
It is proof positive of the fact that legal doctrine masks inherent and
irreducible contradictions, and recalls that it is the role of the legal
critic to expose these contradictions in order to displace the privi-
leged status of law and return the debate to the realm of pure poli-
tics.
257
But is it possible to "expose" contradiction? Is there any such thing as a
"realm of pure politics" separate from "the privileged status of law" to
which the debate over full priority secured credit could be relegated? It
is indeed difficult to distinguish law and politics, but not because "it's all
251. See U.C.C. § 9-323 (2002) (giving security for future advances priority as of the date of
the original financing); U.C.C. § 9-103 (2002) (defining purchase money security interest); U.C.C. §
9-324 (2002) (codifying re priority of purchase money security interest).
252. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (2002).
253. See supra notes 7 & 12.
254. Scott, Politics, supra note, 3, at 1851.
255. Scott, Mythology, supra note, 166, at 857.
256. Scott, Politics, supra note, 3, at 1851.
257. Scott, Mythology, supra note, 166, at 857-58.
20051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
just politics." An attempt to distinguish "the privileged status of law"
from "pure politics" denies the legal institutions, rules and structures that
create political forums and enable political exertions of will.
The erosion of the effectiveness of filing with the expansion of ex-
ceptions for certain secured creditors should not be mistaken for triumph
of political forces driven by capital over a rule of law meant to ensure
fairness. From the vantage point of an imagined community of investors,
(i) exceptions to encourage increased secured lending; and (ii) rules that
signal to other creditors - are both fair. Scott's "twin goals" of Article 9
represent two valid sets of interests that UCC drafters must balance.
258
From the vantage point of critical theory, there is no meta-theory
with which to balance these interests if they are in fact incoherent as
Scott presents them to be. In the words of Duncan Kennedy: "The im-
agery of balancing presupposes exactly the kind of more abstract unit of
measurement that the sense of contradiction excludes., 259 But the imag-
ined community of investors believes that just such an abstract unit of
measurement exists in the form of commitment to wealth maximization.
The way in which Article 9 strikes that balance, the community accepts
in deference to capital, must reflect finance experts' judgments about
how to best increase access to capital for all.
CONCLUSION
Article 9 disregards the effects of full priority on non-adjusting
creditors. But this disregard for fairness should not be mistaken for a
disregard for distributive consequences or attributed to an isolated or
exclusionary drafting process. Article 9 is not the product of secured
creditors asserting their interests in an isolated forum impervious to so-
cial consequences. Rather, it is a product of secured creditors asserting
their interests in a socio-political climate in which the general public
accepts the needs of capital as consonant with public interest.
This article directs attention to the background values and commit-
ments that fuel support for full priority and asset securitization. It ques-
tions the common sense that leads lawmakers and many scholars to con-
sistently err in favor of encouraging these types of financing despite seri-
ous concerns about fairness and efficiency. Article 9's expansion of full
priority secured lending cannot be explained completely by the nature of
the UCC drafting process, the code's technical complexity, or a fatal
diversity of interests among unsecured creditors. No analysis of Article
9 - or asset securitization - is complete without direct acknowledgement
of the hegemony of capitalist values that informs institutional and indi-
vidual common sense with respect to the laws governing finance.
258. See id. at 856.
259. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1775 (1976).
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